The Korean Peninsula’s Nuclear Issue –
The View from Pyongyang

By
Dr. C. Kenneth Quinones
Former U.S. Department of State
North Korea Affairs Officer

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North Korea’s fundamental position regarding resolution of the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula remains very much as DPRK Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and Head of the DPRK Delegation to the 59th session of the UN General Assembly Choe Su Hon outlined on September 27, 2004 in a speech to the UN General Assembly. The key elements of his speech were:

- the political-military situation “prevailing in and around the Korean Peninsula” requires that the DPRK “build up its strong self-defensive military power to prevent war and ensure peace …”
- Korea’s reunification is (a prerequisite to achieving a durable peace on the Korean Peninsula” as stated in the South-North Korea “June 15 2000 Joint Statement.”
- “…, the DPRK is left with no other option but to possess a nuclear deterrent in the face of the situation in which the present US administration, being accustomed to rejecting our [political] system, has been attempting to eliminate the DPRK by force while designating it as part of an ‘axis of evil’ and a target of preemptive nuclear strikes.
- “Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula is our goal, “and the DPRK wishes to “address the nuclear issue between the DPRK and the US peacefully through dialogue and negotiations.”
- “If the United States renounces practically its hostile policy on the DPRK including the cessation of nuclear threats, the DPRK also is willing to scrap its nuclear deterrent accordingly.”
- The DPRK proposes a “package solution based on the principle of ‘word for word’ and ‘action for action,’ and as a first step, offered such a flexible proposal as the ‘reward for freeze.’”
- “Reward for freeze provides that the DPRK would freeze all the nuclear weapon-related facilities and the output from their operation on the premise that the US abandons its hostile policy, in particularly its assertion on the “complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of our nuclear program (CVID), and that at the same time, the United states would lift its economic sanctions and blockade against the DPRK, de-list the DPRK from the ‘sponsors of terrorism’ and participate in compensation of energy worth the capability of two million KW.”
- Implementation of the “reward for freeze” should be done on a “step-by-step basis of simultaneous actions.”
In order to further clarify our will to dismantle the nuclear deterrent, we had intended to include in our freeze no more manufacturing of nuclear weapons, and no test and transfer of them. The US, however, disregarding the common understanding and agreement reach at the third round of the Six Party Talks (June 2004), has been further intensifying its hostile acts against the DPRK in a more undisguised way, even openly announcing that there would be no reward for the freeze and dismantlement of our nuclear facilities.

Most recently (September 2004), the US “passed a ‘bill on human rights in North Korea’ and thus fixed it as a law to provide financial and material support for overthrowing our system and force third countries to do so.”

The DPRK “is also of the position to continue the Six Party Talks,” but only if “the United States has the will to co-exist peacefully with the DPRK by abandoning its hostile policy. Only then can “the nuclear issue will be resolved properly.”