

**The American NGO
Experience in North Korea
(UNPUBLISHED VERSION)**

Introduction: A trickle of representatives from American humanitarian organizations began arriving in the bitterly cold month of February, 1996. They represented Mercy Corps, a non-governmental organization, or NGO, based in Portland, Oregon, and the Latter Day Saints Charities, the Mormon Church supported NGO, or private voluntary organization (PVO). Their purpose was to assess the needs of North Korea=s population in the wake of appeals by the United Nations World Food Program (WFP) and International Red Cross and Red Crescent Society (IFRC) for huge amounts of food and medical aid.ⁱ

These well intended good Samaritans were late, but eager to help. Six months had already passed since abnormally heavy rains in August 1995 had wrecked havoc in North Korea=s northwest provinces. Thousands of homes had been washed away, road and railroads destroyed, disrupting the distribution of food through the Public Distribution System (PDS). The maize crop, concentrated in the northwest provinces, had been destroyed. What little had not turned hard as stone had been eaten as it was being harvested. The rice crop had also sustained extensive damage.

Paradoxically, human folly was largely responsible for the damage to the rice crop in the southwestern provinces. During the rains, the gates of the West Sea Barrage, an eight kilometer long tidal dam that blocks the flow of the Taedong River into the Yellow or West Sea, were not opened. A huge amount of water backed up into tens of thousands of hectares of rice paddy. Trapped beneath deep water, pollination of the rice crop was prevented. After the gates had been opened belatedly, and the rains had ceased, the rice stalks stood tall. From a distance, they appeared to have kernels of rice. On close examination, however, the husks were empty. Much of the rice crop had been destroyed. At the same time, the man-made flooding inundated Pyongyang=s sewage system and backed raw sewage into the city=s supply of drinking water. In some areas of the city, sewage contaminated flood waters filled streets, further intensifying an already severe crisis in public health.

Much of the damage elsewhere in the nation was invisible. North Korea maintained large Awar@ reserves of grain. According to official sources quoted by UNDP officials resident in Pyongyang, this reserve amounted to more than 3,000,000 metric tons of grain. Stored in underground bunkers, flood waters filled these storage bins and rendered the grain useless. Coal mines were also flooded, preventing the extraction of the most common fuel for heating homes and cooking food. All that winter and the next, smoke coming from home chimneys was a rare site. In Pyongyang, lacking fuel to heat water, people could no longer take baths nor wash clothes. Dysentery and influenza became widespread. An epidemic of cholera loomed as a possibility.

At the time of the floods, the sole resident representative of the United Nations was Faruq

Akizad, the representative of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). He had toured the flooded areas in early September using a North Korean government helicopter. His video tape of the devastation was stunning.² UN relief agencies, lead by the World Food Program (WFP), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO, Rome) and UNICEF, responded immediately with medicine, clothing, kitchen kits and bedding. By October, the first resident representative of the WFP, the British citizen and career UN civil servant Trevor Page, opened an office in Pyongyang=s diplomatic compound. A trickle of food aid began arriving in November. The IFRC had also responded immediately. They too had opened an office in Pyongyang staffed by another British citizen. UNICEF representatives from Hong Kong took up residence in the Koryo Hotel, Pyongyang=s premiere hotel for foreign visitors.

Representatives of these relief agencies met over dinner in early October 1995 to coordinate their efforts. The WFP would focus on the western and southwestern provinces of North Korea, centering its effort on Nampo, North Korea=s main port on the west coast and the arrival point for the first shipments of food aid. The Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies complemented would concentrate on distributing food aid and medicine in the southeast province of Kangwon and the main east coast port of Wonsan. UNICEF would work to distribute kitchen kits, bedding and clothing to the flood victims in the northwest provinces, particularly the devastated area east of the Korea-China border city of Sinuiju. The sole US government representative, State Department Officer Kenneth Quinones, would tour as many provinces as possible and meet each Wednesday evening at the Koryo Hotel=s first flood Korean restaurant. (At the time, he spent every other month of 1995 living in North Korea with a small group of American nuclear technicians at North Korea=s Nyongbyon Nuclear Research Center.)

The meetings of the small group of foreigners became weekly events. Huddled over a couple of tables in the unheated back room and surrounded by cigarette puffing, raucous North Korea officials, they exchanged knowledge of conditions outside Pyongyang over a dinner of imported barbequed beef, rice and Japanese beer (there was no kimchi and little rice because the cabbage crop had rotted).

By January 1996, the international effort in North Korea had become substantial, but relative to need, it was still inadequate. UN relief agencies reported at a January 17, 1996 relief coordination meeting that various donors had contributed a total of \$27,963,254 to the UN appeal issued in September 1995 for aid to the DPRK. Of this amount, UN agencies had already spent close to \$3 million for food, clothing, kitchen equipment, etc. Red Cross Societies in several countries, including South Korea and the USA, had contributed an additional \$1.33 million of aid to North Korea.

The broader international community reacted in varying ways. Syria pledged \$5.850 million worth of grain. China contributed \$3.6 million worth of relief goods. The South Korean and Japanese governments pledged and began shipping immediately 300,000 metric tons of grain, mostly rice. The Japanese government provided an additional \$500,000 in cash to selected UN relief agencies. The European Union=s humanitarian organization, ECHO, and EU members

contributed \$3,250,000 worth of food, clothing and medicine. Nations in South and Southeast Asia added an additional \$505,000 worth of aid. Even Russia, then enduring its own shortage of food, sent 27 tons of food, blankets and medical supplies valued at \$136,278.

Non-government organizations (NGO) also made substantial donations. Japanese NGOs led the way with \$1.4 million in food and medicine from the Nippon Foundation and the Association of Medical Doctors of Asia. World Vision International, based in Manila but with substantial funding coming from Japan, South Korea and the United States, supplied wheat flour for noodles, noodle making machines and medicine valued at \$1,160,000. The French medical NGO Doctors without Borders supplied \$1,000,000 worth of medicine, and Germany=s Neue Apostolic Church added another \$214,000. The Swiss based ADRA International contributed \$700,000 worth of support to the UN appeal for North Korea. The international Catholic charity Caritas sent \$530,000 worth of rice. Obviously, these were substantial contributions from the international NGO community with an approximate value of \$4,000,000.³

But in Washington, D.C., the US government=s response from the beginning was impeded by quarreling among the various agencies concerned with policy toward North Korea. Key persons in the United States government, particularly the Department of Defense (DoD) and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) greeted the reports of devastation with scepticism. Some at the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) dismissed Mr. Akizad=s video tape as dating from the Korean War. At the end of September, the Department of State=s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance sent UNICEF a check for \$225,000, \$200,000 to be used as needed and \$25,000 designated for use in North Korea. Meanwhile, the governments in Seoul and Tokyo contributed millions of dollars worth of aid, primarily through UN relief agencies.⁴

Early Encounters - 1980-95: Some leaders of the Korean-American community in the United States began visiting North Korea in the 1980s. Virtually every trip was motivated by a desire to find and help long lost relatives. They journeyed either as individuals or as representatives of small Korean-American churches and community organizations. Many came from the relatively large Korean-American communities in Los Angeles, New York, Washington, D.C. and Honolulu. They included Revered Edward Kang of Virginia, then of Vienna, Virginia, who arrived in Pyongyang in the late 1980s only to learn at the airport that his mother had died the week before. Victor Hsu, originally a native of Taiwan, led several groups of Korean-Americans to Pyongyang in connection with his humanitarian work at the World Council of Churches in New York. Dr. Pilju Kim Joo, and American educated agronomist resident in Minnesota and her husband Don, a specialist in animal husbandry, began working with counterparts at North Korea=s Academy of Agricultural Sciences in the late 1980s to improve grain crops and animal husbandry techniques. The Korean-American businessman and church activist from Seattle, Washington made occasional visits to Pyongyang, each time taking small amounts of medicine, money and clothing as gifts for his kinsmen.

A few represented academic institutions: the University of Hawaii, University of California

at Berkeley, Harvard University and George Washington University. Their purpose was to facilitate educational exchange by arranging brief study tours from Americans to visit North Korea and vice versa. Dr. Yong Chin Kim of George Washington University in Washington, D.C. led a number of visits and brought small groups of North Korea=s to the United States. Dr. Suh Dae Suk of the University of Hawaii pioneered visits to Kim Il Sung University in Pyongyang, aided by his wife=s kinship ties to Kim Il Sung=s son-in-law and speaker of the Supreme People=s Assembly Yang Hyon-sop. Dr. Tony Namkung, whose father was a prominent anti-Japanese Korean nationalist and socialist, arranged similar study tours for the Asia Society. Chong-ae Yu of the American Friends Service Committee was another pioneer of educational exchanges.

One of the more distinguished and accomplished pioneers was Dr. Hyun Bong-hak, a Korean-American resident of New Jersey. He had learned English at a small Korean founded middle school in Yanji, China. After Korea=s liberation from Japan in 1945, his family returned to their home in Pyongyang. Hyun=s father sent him to Seoul for study. When the Korean War broke out, Hyun fled south where he was drafted into the South Korean army. Because of his fluency in English, he was assigned to a US Marine Corps unit and served with it until war=s end. American missionaries then financed his study of medicine in Richmond, Virginia. At Johns Hopkins Hospital in Baltimore, he became an accomplished medical doctor. Dr. Hyun in the 1980s quietly began to visit Pyongyang. He began teaching medicine at the Pyongyang Medical College, located two blocks from the Koryo Hotel. Eventually, he was able to begin delivering modern medical equipment to the hospital with financial support from various Korean-American organizations.⁵

One of the few non-Korean American pioneers was Dr. Peter Hayes. An Australian citizen, Hayes in the late 1980's shifted from general environmental concerns and work with the Asia Development Bank to promoting better understanding between the United States and North Korea. After publishing a book on the question of nuclear weapons proliferation in northeast Asia, *Pacific Powderkeg, American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea*. (Lexington, MA.: Lexington Books, 1991), he established the Nautilus Institute to facilitate educational and data exchange between the two countries. The Nautilus Institute in Berkeley, California today is recognized internationally for its efforts not only to enhance US-North Korea understanding, but also North America - East Asia understanding in the areas of national security, nuclear proliferation and energy.

In every case, however, government regulations, impeded and complicated these pioneering efforts to open private channels of communication between the United States and North Korea. U.S. government imposed economic sanctions restricted each US citizen visitor to delivering more than \$400.00 worth of gifts to relatives in North Korea. Licenses to export larger quantities of basic human needs@ were authorized in 1988, but obtaining a license was time consuming and expensive.

A greater impediment was the fact that the Cold War had yet to end on the Korean Peninsula. After 1984, US citizen travel to North Korea was unrestricted. Citizens of South Korea, however, could not in any way contact someone from a communist nation, including a relative, without

risking breaking the notorious National Security Law strictly enforced by Seoul=s still authoritarian government. The South Korean government considered Korean-Americans to be subject to Seoul=s National Security Law which required permission prior to each contact with someone in a communist country, particularly North Korea. South Korean intelligence officers stationed in the United States expected Korean-American citizens of the U.S. to provide post- North Korea visit debriefings. These officials suggested they were in close communication with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), an accurate claim.

Then too the North Korean government had its all pervasive political agenda. It sought to screen foreign visitors according to stern political criteria. In short, only the most highly motivated American citizens would even consider visiting North Korea. For the fortunate few who received visas to visit North Korea, every aspect of their visit - the timing, duration, people and places visited - were all controlled. Fearful of potential political repercussions to relatives and friends in either North or South Korea, and concerned about FBI challenges to their loyalty to the United States and/or compliance with the Trading With the Enemy and related Congressional Acts, this earliest phase of the Korean-American NGO effort in North Korea remains invisible to most Americans. Consequently, the flow of visitors and humanitarian assistance remained a trickle, even in 1996. Nevertheless, these pioneers provided invaluable insight into North Korea, which remained even in 1996 a foreboding and strange land.

American Grain Sales- 1990-95: Rumors of food shortages in North Korea date from the late 1980s. Visitors to the Northeast provinces recalled stories from relatives. Korean-Chinese in northeast China were visited by relatives seeking food to take back to North Korea. But the United State government knew of the growing scarcity of grain in North Korea as early as 1991.⁶

In 1988, the United States government in tandem with South Korea sought to defuse North Korea=s frustration over not being involved in the 1988 Seoul Olympiad by extending an olive branch called the Amodest initiative.@ This diplomatic gesture opened the way for Americans to export Abasic human needs@ to North Korea. This included grain, educational materials and similar goods which were not of value to North Korea=s military. Transactions would require the Departments of the Treasury and Commerce, with concurrence by the Departments of State and Defense, to issue licenses.

Then President George Bush=s chief of staff while he was vice president, Retired Admiral and former deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Daniel Murphy was the first American businessman to obtain a license. Admiral Murphy was a close personal friend of then President George Bush. The two men had worked closely during the so-called Iran-Contra Affair of the 1980s. Murphy had retired as a consequence of this political storm and gone into the business of selling arms. A conservative Republican, Murphy also was an accomplished fund raiser for the Republic Party. In 1991, President Bush arranged for Admiral Murphy to receive a huge export license that authorized the sale and export of upwards of \$1.3 billion worth of grain to North Korea.

To pursue this opportunity, Murphy established Nikko Enterprises of New Jersey. His business partners included former New Jersey Republican Congressman, and prominent lobbyist in Washington, D.C., James Courter (whose law office is across the street from the Department of Treasury). To assist them, they hired a Korean-American commodity dealer David Chang. Between 1991 and 1994, Murphy and Chang made several trips to North Korea where they met Kim Jong Il and toured many of North Korea=s industrial and military facilities. At the same time, they sold North Korea a total of 558,800 metric tons of grain between August 16, 1991 and June 22, 1995. These sales were worth a total of \$77,851,518. North Korea paid for more than half this amount, \$23,851,518 plus 13,000 metric tons of zinc. But when payments fell behind at the end of 1993, the business arrangement ceased. Murphy and Courter, however, continued to work with Chang on other projects until the aging Murphy retired and closed his Georgetown lobbying firm, Murphy and Associates, in late 1995. The final shipment of grain in July 1995 arrived just as the torrential rains began to fall.

One year earlier in August 1994, North Korean diplomat Han Song-ryol approached then North Korea Desk Officer C. Kenneth Quinones at the US-DPRK nuclear negotiations in Geneva to suggest US food aid as compensation for North Korea=s agreement to end its nuclear reactor construction program. Han specified North Korea needed one million metric tons per year. Asked how he could expect the US to provide such a large amount of grain, Han responded he understood the US supplied similarly large amounts of grain to other nations under the P.L. 480 Program (Public Law 480 authorizes the export of government purchased, surplus US grain to be used as food aid.) Then State Department Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Thomas Hubbard, immediately dismissed the proposal. North Korea continued its request until the signing of the US-DPRK Agreed Framework on October 21, 1994. Instead of food aid, the United States agreed to supply North Korea 500,000 metric tons of heavy fuel oil annually until two light water reactors had been built in North Korea as part of the first ever diplomatic accord between the two countries.

Preconceptions: The American NGOs who arrived in North Korea in the first half of 1996 had ample reason to believe they could help the North Korean people. Many on their boards of directors shared the conviction that Christianity and democracy gave them moral and political superiority. They and their parents had served on the frontiers of Christianity and democracy in China during the 1930s and 1940s. When their benevolent effort to transform China ended in frustration with the rise of Mao Tse-deng=s communist China, they shifted their focus to South Korea. America=s Christian NGOs cared for South Korea=s hungry, its orphans and ultimately, through education and medicine, nurtured belief in Christianity and respect for democracy. While maintaining their independence from all governments, their own and that of South Korea, America=s Christian NGOs coordinated their efforts with those of the US Agency for International Development, the United States Information Agency, the Fulbright Program and the Central Intelligence Agency funded Asia Foundation. None can deny that the team work between American missionaries and their government was of tremendous mutual benefit. Simultaneously, it ensured maximum benefit to a broad sector of South Korean society.

No sooner had the American Christian NGO endeavors in South Korea given rise to an increasingly prosperous and pluralistic society than Southeast Asia's Aboat people@ called for help. Beginning in 1978, tens of thousands of Vietnamese and Cambodians were fleeing their homelands to bordering nations and the open sea. Once again, war and communism in Asia had wrought terrible suffering on an innocent multitude. America's Christian NGOs responded with compassion, material aid and by pressuring the United States government to do more to care for these hapless people. This latter aspect, criticism of their government and advocacy of policy were new roles for America's NGOs. A decade after the exodus from Vietnam and Cambodia had begun, the situation stabilized. An international agreement, the Comprehensive Plan of Action, facilitated the orderly departure of qualified Vietnamese from Vietnam and the return of Cambodian refugees from Thailand to their homeland. Under UN auspices, economic aid was following into both nations to rebuild their agriculture based economies. American NGOs were at the vanguard of this international effort, caring for the hungry and homeless in Southeast Asia while pressing their government at home to implement policies that would nurture economic recovery and a durable peace in Southeast Asia.

Looking back, their efforts had a profound and enduring impact on US policy toward the region, and toward the care and feeding of refugees around the world. In South Korea, both the South Korean and US governments had welcomed America's Christian NGOs as a valuable supplement to their efforts to rebuild South Korea after the Korean War. In Southeast Asia, the American NGOs did not have to contend with the hostile regimes in Cambodia and Vietnam, nor did they have to reside in either nation to pursue their work. Instead, the American NGOs could rely on their government to support the work of the UN High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) to press the Thai government to accommodate American and other NGOs within its borders so they could care for the hundreds of thousands of refugees in camps along the Thai-Cambodia border.

In North Korea, American NGOs would soon learn they faced entirely new challenges. Their work there would place them in an intense political vortex. The North Korean government and North Korea people would view them through the prism of a half century of hatred and distrust for Americans. For many officials in Pyongyang, the American NGOs were there to spy their nation's weaknesses, pollute their native culture, and undermine political stability by propagating the selfish values of democracy and capitalism. To many in the South Korean government at the time, the self proclaimed work of America's humanitarian idealists perpetuated the despotic government of Kim Jong Il and undermined South Korea's ability to achieve national reunification. Many politically influential persons in Washington, D.C. echoed the concerns voiced in Seoul. While advocates of a Asoft,@ gradual and non-violent transformation of North Korea welcomed the American NGO effort, those who championed the Ahard landing@ approach assaulted it.

Advocacy, 1996-97: The intensity of these colliding political currents caught the American NGOs by surprise. Upon returning home, Mercy Corps Vice President for International Affairs Ellsworth Culver and LDS Charities Gary Flake quickly discovered their first task had to be advocacy of their cause. Those who followed them from World Vision, American Aid, American Friends Service Committee, American National Council of Churches, Catholic Relief Service, and Church World Service (CWS) quickly came to the same conclusion. They would have to explain

their intentions not just to their home government, but even more importantly to the government of the population these sought to help. This was unprecedented for American NGOs working in East Asia.

The need to advocate their cause distracted from their desire to send aid. Consequently, the amount of aid remained a relative trickle during the following year. CWS managed to send food, clothing and medicine worth \$1,550,380; and LDS \$327,750 worth of clothing, powdered milk, medicine and support to UNICEF. Mercy Corps sent fifty tons of grain. Total US NGO food aid to North Korea in 1996, however, amounted to only 2,110 metric tons. At the time, the WFP estimated the need to be in excess of one million tons of grain.

Initially, some NGOs vented their frustration on the US government. They urged it to relax export barriers regarding North Korea. The reality remained, however, that the distance, logistics and various governments= bureaucratic impediments simply made sending food aid an expensive and labor intensive effort that yielded little benefit for the intended beneficiaries - the people of North Korea. NGOs working alone could afford to send only one or two containers full of grain, clothing and medicine at any one time. Doing so across the Pacific to North Korea proved expensive and complex. No international shipping lines frequented North Korean ports. Containers had to be transhipped either through China or South Korea. In both countries, customs clearance procedures proved time consuming and customs duties expensive. From Chinese ports, the aid had to sit on docks for weeks awaiting the arrival of a North Korean cargo carrier. In South Korea, shipments from Pusan and Inchon to Nampo more often halted by the frequently shifting political winds of the Korean Peninsula.

As evident from the chart below, American NGOs= contribution of food aid was never substantial relative to the amounts provided by governments and the NGOs of other nations. The NGO=s of Europe, primarily through the IFRC and CARITAS, sent some 261,000 metric tons of grain, powdered milk, enriched soy blend, sugar, canned meat and fish, etc. NGOs in South Korea also contributed a large amount of food aid. More than two thirds of the 297,510 metric tons of food aid sent by South Korean NGOs, however, was provided by the South Korean Red Cross, a quasi-governmental organization. The founder of the Hyundai multinational business conglomerate, Chung Ju-yong, sent 70,000 metric tons of grain, not to mention 500 cattle, when he made his famous pilgrimage in June 1998 to his home village in North Korea. (See Appendix III.b.)

US NGO FOOD AID TO DPRK 1996-2001

Metric Tons (M/T), Source: UN WFP

NGO	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	TOTAL
ADM (USA)	-0-	-0-	327	-0-	-0-	-0-	327
CHS (USA)	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	36	35	71
CWS (USA)	-0-	1,676	113	-0-	-0-	61	1,850
FHI (USA)	-0-	255	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	255
FTC (USA)	180	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	180
KASM (USA)	-0-	5,211	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	5,211
KAP (USA)	-0-	-0-	360	-0-	-0-	-0-	360
LDSC (USA)	80	-0-	180	-0-	1,000	-0-	1,260
MCI (USA)	50	19	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	69
SBAP (USA)	160	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	160
UMCOR (USA)	-0-	300	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	300
WSC (USA)	-0-	868	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	868
WVI	1,640	1,040	301	-0-	-0-	-0-	2,981
Sub-total	2,110	8,501	1,281	-0-	1,036	96	12,024

Note: The Eugene Bell Centennial Foundation is not listed here because it is registered with the South Korean government as a South Korean NGO. While it facilitated the delivery of food aid to North Korea in 1997, the Korean-American Sharing Movement was responsible for raising the funds.

In the spring of 1996, NGOs began gathering at the InterAction headquarters in Washington, D.C. InterAction, formed in 1984, is a coalition of more than 150 US-based, relief, development and refugee agencies working in more than 100 countries. Member organizations are required to maintain the organization's rigorous ethical standards to ensure accountability to donors, professional competence and quality of service to those in need. Most of the organization's activities are funded by members' dues and private donations. An entirely private organization, since its inception, InterAction and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) have found it mutually beneficial to work together to quicken their response to humanitarian crises, and to maximize the positive impact of their combined resources. Consequently, USAID does provide the organization some financial support. But InterAction's fiscal resources are sufficient to preserve its independence from the US government.

**TOTAL FOOD AID TO DPRK
1995-2001 - 1,000 Metric Tons**

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	TOTAL
Government Food Aid		779.3	464.25	747.1	823.0	888.2	971.7	4,673,500
NGO Food Aid		65.2	185.6	260.1	26.0	48.9	39.6	625,400
TOTAL		844.5	649.8	1,007.2	849.0	937.1	1,011.3	5,298,900

FOOD AID SOURCE:	GOVERNMENT	NGO	TOTAL	% of TOTAL	
Four Powers: USA	- 1,322,300	28.3%	12,024	1,334,324	25.2%
RoKorea	- 789,700	16.9%	292,289	1,081,989	20.3%
Japan	- 701,800	15.0%	2,095	703,895	13.3%
China	- 618,500	13.2	-0-	618,500	11.7%
Sub-total	- 3,432,300	- 73.4%	306,418	3,738,718	70.5%
Europe	720,960	- 15.4%	261,065	982,025	18.5%
Middle East	370,150	- 7.9%	-0-	370,150	7.0%
South/Southeast Asia	120,100	- 2.6%	9,417	129,517	
North America	29,800	- 0.6%	48,500	78,300	
Totals	4,673,310	- 99.9%	625,400	5,298,710	

Annual average food aid to DPRK, 1996-2001: 883,150,000 Metric Tons per year

Government provided food aid: 88.2%

NGO supplied food aid: Sub-total 11.8%

Collective Action: The American NGO contribution was more substantial in areas other than material aid. Early on, the impediments and frustrations of shipping food to North Korea and dealing with the various governments= requirements convinced several NGOs to invest their resources elsewhere. A relatively small group, however, came together in Washington, D.C. and began to develop a strategy for dealing with the situation. They determined collective action - close cooperation, collaboration and coordination - would minimize the ability of any government, particularly the one in Pyongyang, to manipulate their humanitarian efforts. At the same time, collective action would maximize their ability to negotiate with the North Korea government for what they sought - access to the North Korean people, and accountability and transparency for the distribution of their aid inside North Korea. They would further magnify the impact of their effort by aligning themselves with the UN relief agencies= experts in Pyongyang, and by establishing a network to facilitate communication and cooperation with NGOs in Europe, Japan and South Korea.

Advocacy is a primary activity of InterAction. The goal is to ensure the maximum, efficient and beneficial use of US government aid resources in areas and for people having the greatest need. Mercy Corps International, working closely with Church World Services headquartered in New York, assumed leadership of the American effort. In Washington, DC, they formed a Working Group on North Korea. Initially, its primary purpose was to facilitate the exchange of information between NGOs, and with the humanitarian agencies of the US government, about their work and condition in North Korea. From it evolved a number of groups designed to represent collectively NGO interests to governments.

NGOs represented on the InterAction North Korea Working Group=s executive committee included: Adventist Development and Relief Agency International (ADRA), American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Church World Service (CWS), Heifer Project International, Holt International Children=s Services, International Aid, Latter-day Saint Charities (LSD Charities), Mercy Corps (MC), United Methodist Committee on Relief (UMCOR), and the US Fund for UNICEF.⁷

Members divided themselves by functional specialization. The following list is not exhaustive, but reflects the Working Groups early membership. Several NGO, American and foreign, eventually joined the group after 1996:

Agriculture and Food Production: ADRA, AFSC, CARE, CWS, Christian Reformed World Relief Committee, the Heifer Project, Holt, MC, UMCOR, UNICEF, and World Vision Relief and Development

Disaster and Emergency Relief: ADRA, AFSC, CWS, International Aid, LDS Charities, MC.

Education Training: AFSC, American Red Cross (ARC), Christian Reformed World Relief Committee, Heifer Project, MC, UNICEF.

Energy: ADRA

Health Care: AFSC, ARC, Holt, International Aid and UNICEF

Human Rights and Conflict Resolution: AFSC

Other interested NGOs, but not members of InterAction included: the Carter Center, Eugene Bell Foundation, Jewish Joint Distribution Committee and the Korean-American Sharing Movement (which eventually joined the Working Group.).

Early on, the Working Group excelled in advocating changes in US policy toward North Korea that would facilitate and quicken the delivery of material aid to North Korea. Under persistent pressure from American NGOs, particularly the Korean-American Christian community, economic sanctions on North Korea were loosened to facilitate the shipment of food, clothing and medicine directly to North Korea.. InterAction=s advocacy early in 1996 was at least partially responsible for convincing USAID to announce in June 1996 that the United State would provide the WFP \$6.2 million for the purchase and shipment of food aid to North Korea. By June 1996, InterAction=s North Korea Working Group had assumed leadership of the American NGO effort

aimed at North Korea.⁸

The Musgrove Movement: The InterAction North Korea Working Group, at Mercy Corps= behest, set in motion in the summer of 1996 a collaborative effort aimed at broadening the network of NGOs working in North Korea as well as establishing broad goals and a strategy for achieving them. Ellsworth Culver convinced the ARCA Foundation, beneficiary of the Alcoa Aluminum corporation=s endowment, to fund the first two international conferences on aid for North Korea. Held at the ARCA Foundation=s chairman=s family retreat at Musgrove, Georgia, the conferences became known as Musgrove I and II. The US government was represented at each of the gatherings, as were several agencies of the United Nations. ,Representatives of the North Korean government were invited, but declined to attend.

The first conference met in November 1996. Some seventy five representatives from NGOs, governments and UN agencies gathered for two days to exchange experiences and contact information, and to discuss future priorities and strategies to deal with the humanitarian crisis in North Korea. The gathering was a resounding success for most of the participants. It immediately linked them into an international network of NGO, afforded access to information about working conditions in North Korea, the status of programs and areas of future need. From the gathering emerged The Committee to Stop the Famine, which immediately initiated a coordinated advocacy program aimed at winning Congressional support for food aid for North Korea. The committee gained the attention and support of Congressman Tony Hall., the most influential and respect advocate for humanitarian assistance in the United States Congress.⁹

Some NGOs, like the representative from the Eugene Bell Foundation, found the gathering frustrating. In this particular case, the individual ardently advocated his belief that only Korean-speaking NGOs could lead the effort in North Korea. Born in South Korea and virtually a native speaker of Korea, Dr. Stephen Linton made a bid to head soon to be established FALU office in Pyongyang. The vast majority of NGOs, unfamiliar with the Korean language, rejected his proposal. For them, the greater need was to have an NGO from a politically neutral nation who had extensive experience as an NGO. The majority of NGOs also found unacceptable Dr. Linton=s contention that North Korea=s inexperience in dealing with international organizations should excuse it from having to conform to the requirements of UN agencies and donor governments regarding transparency and monitoring of the food distribution system. On the contrary, most conference participants agreed that the North Korean government should feel obliged to do as all other aid recipient governments had done elsewhere and conform to international requirements and standards. Dr. Linton excused himself from the confederation of NGOs and ever since has opted to work independent from InterAction=s members. Later, board members of the Eugene Bell Foundation asked him to leave their organization, and take the foundation=s name with him. The board retained the foundation=s assets and renamed itself Christian Friends of Korea (CFK). Dr. Linton eventually registered his foundation with the South Korean government and since has relied on it for financial support of its tuberculosis programs in North Korea.¹⁰

Representatives from NGOs across North America, Europe and eventually South Korea and Japan attended Musgrove II in the fall of 1997. The second Musgrove Conference confirmed

continuity of the annual gatherings and the consensus of the majority of NGOs, both in the United States and elsewhere, to coordinate, and where ever possible, to collaborate in the humanitarian effort in North Korea. The Musgrove Movement, to coin a term, spread internationally.

A new, key player emerged in 1997, the Korean American Sharing Movement or KASM. The non-profit, private voluntary organization was a loose association of some 500 organizations that represented 45,000 Korean Americans in Los Angeles, New York, Chicago, Washington, D.C., Atlanta and San Francisco. The movement had begun in the late winter of 1996-97 to raise money to send food and medicine to North Korea. The Washington-Baltimore Chapter raised \$100,000 in February, 1997 to purchase corn in China as aid for North Korea. Working with the Eugene Bell Centennial Foundation, this initial effort encountered all the logistical realities of shipping food. Obtaining a US government export license proved relatively easy. Purchasing quality grain in China and shipping it via railroad to North Korea proved far more challenging. Eventually, 300 metric tons, 200 tons less than originally planned, were sent to North Korea with the assistance of the IFRC.¹¹

Additional shipments of maize followed. Altogether, KASM raised over \$1,000,000 to ship about 5,500 metric tons of maize to North Korea between February and September, 1997. An additional 63.3 tons of urea fertilizer were purchased. About one quarter of the total shipments were facilitated by the Eugene Bell Centennial Foundation (EBCF). The remainder was delivered via the IFRC, except for the fertilizer which was donated to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).

KASM joined InterAction=s Committee to Stop Famine in North Korea, a consortium of eighteen American NGOs involved in North Korea. Its representative was Dr. Jong Park, a civil service official at the Federal Reserve Bank in Washington, D.C. KASM co-hosted Musgrove II, the second international NGO conference on North Korea in the fall of 1997. In addition to drawing the Korean-American community into the mainstream of NGO programs focused on North Korea, KASM established a partnership with the Seoul-based Korean Sharing Movement (KSM).

1999 Beijing Conference: After the 1997 gathering, a meeting convened in Seoul the next year, but the fourth conference was not held until May 1999 in Beijing, China in May 1999. For the first time, representatives of the Chinese government, academic institutions and social welfare organizations participated in the follow on conference held in Beijing in May 1999. The gathering quickly became a forum for identifying areas of common concern and publicly urging the appropriate authorities to take action to address these issues.¹²

David Morton, UN Humanitarian Coordinator for the DPRK, identified the priority operational objectives for the NGO effort as being:

- § **Food Security** - including both the provision of food aid, and increasing the amount of food in the country through agricultural recovery.
- § **Health** - It is vital to address both the immediate and the re-emerging public health needs. The World Health Organization (WHO) pointed out the re-emergence of diseases that had

previously been contained in the DPRK.

§ **Water Supplies and Sanitation:** These concerns were considered an integral part of health, and, Morton emphasized, a contributing factor to malnutrition.

§ **Capacity Building** - increase the capacity of institutions in the country to deal more effectively with the nation=s problems.

§ **Education** - promote the activities of UNICEF.

§ **Coordination** - maintain close communication and coordination between all elements of the international relief effort.

§

The conference participants affirmed their support for the UN=s humanitarian principles subscribed to in November 1998 by all organizations then providing humanitarian assistance to the DPRK (see Appendix VII. a.). The Beijing Conference participants also concurred that the North Korean government was not:

B accepting international standards to ensure assistance reached the most needy,

B allowing adequate access to vulnerable groups, and

B continued to require prearranged monitoring visits.

Also at the Beijing Conference, UNDP Deputy Resident Representative Kirsten Jorgensen highlighted her organization=s AREP or Agricultural Recovery and Environmental Projection Program. The DPRK government in 1997 had asked the UNDP to formulate with it an extensive plan to rebuild North Korea=s agrarian economic sector. The first thematic Roundtable convened in Geneva in May 1998 to review various proposals. Specialists from UNDP, FAO, IFAD and WFP, working with their North Korean counterparts, came up with plan unveiled in November 1998 that called for US \$343.7 million in aid over a five year period. Central to the effort would be innovative short to medium-term agricultural programs such as double-cropping, crop diversification, agro-forestry, land rehabilitation, local marketing channels, credit and rehabilitation of fertilizer plants. The AREP plan aimed to:

B reduce North Korea=s dependency on food aid by achieving optimum grain production,

B make more cost effective use of the US \$150-200 million governments were spending annually to supply food aid to North Korea.¹³

2000 Tokyo Conference: Japanese NGOs, long isolated from South Korean and American NGOs in their efforts to aid North Korea, eagerly hosted the 2000 International NGO Conference on North Korea in Tokyo, Japan in June 2000. This gathering convinced USAID to build a bridge of global partnership between US and Japanese NGOs through the US-Japanese governments= long dormant public/private partnership or P3 initiative.¹⁴ Meanwhile, South Korean NGOs moved to assume leadership of the international NGO effort in North Korea by hosting the 2001 International NGO Conference on North Korea in Seoul, Korea. At the conclusion of the Seoul Conference, a consensus report was distributed to the press. In the report, conference participants strongly endorsed the South Korean government=s engagement policy with North Korea, commended the European Union=s efforts to provide humanitarian assistance, and urged the US and Japanese governments to continue their aid. The NGOs also urged the North Korean government to allow greater access to the North Korean people.

2001 Seoul Conference: South Korean NGOs, understandably proud of their growing role since 1998 in addressing the humanitarian crises in North Korea, hosted the 2001 NGO conference in Seoul. The two day conference concluded with the participants approving a list of recommendations for future action.¹⁵

- § The South Korean government=s policy of diplomatic engagement and economic cooperation with North Korea was strongly endorsed.
- § The European Union was urged to continue it=s efforts to provide humanitarian aid to North Korea.
- § The United States and Japanese governments were urged to move beyond food aid to more development-oriented assistance.
- § Cooperative and complementary programs among NGOs were encouraged.
- § Corporations were called upon to support the NGO humanitarian effort.

The Musgrove Movement established an international framework for the international NGO effort in North Korea. It set the precedent for annual gatherings of NGOs concerned about the humanitarian situation in North Korea, established a global network via email that facilitated cooperation, coordination and collaboration. In the United States, the extensive network of Korean-American NGOs was drawn into the mainstream of the American and international NGO movement. Through KASM, ties with one of South Korea=s major NGO movements was formalized. The pooling of information enabled NGOs to establish aid priorities according to the greatest need of potential beneficiaries, rather than in response to either the requests of the North Korean government or donors at home. Working together, the NGOs= advocacy of solutions to a multitude of concerns - financial, operational and strategic - had a much more constructive impact on governments and international organizations. At the same time, by closing ranks, the NGOs minimized the North Korea government=s ability to manipulate them by playing one organization off against another.

FALU - Antecedent of the US PVOC: Paralleling the AMusgrove Movement,@ InterAction=s North Korea Working group turned to the task of institutionalizing structures to deal with both the North Korean and US governments. This effort contributed to the formation of the Food Aid Liaison Unit (FALU as it is usually called) in Pyongyang, the USAID funded Private Voluntary Organization Consortium or PVOC to monitor the distribution of food for work aid in North Korea, and the privately funded Agriculture PVOC based at InterAction.

The Working Group=s efforts also led to the formation in Pyongyang of FALU or Food Aid Liaison Unit. The group=s purpose was to facilitate communication between member NGOs, regardless of nationality, and the North Korean government=s Flood Damage Rehabilitation Committee (FDRC). Early on the Pyongyang government had established this inter-agency committee to deal with all foreign NGOs, except those from South Korea and Japan. The only authorized channel of communication between those two nations and North Koreans was the Korea Workers= (communist) Party=s Asia-Pacific Peace Committee (APPC). Most other NGOs were required to deal with the FDRC, which brought together representatives from the Ministries of:

Foreign Affairs, Agriculture, Trade and Internal Security. (See Appendix VIII). The first American NGOs to begin work in North Korea were not required to deal with the FDRC. For example, the Nautilus Institute worked with the KWP=s APPC and Church World Services (CWS) dealt with Pyongyang=s Korean Christian Federation.

FALU aspired to provide support to non-resident NGOs seeking to monitor the distribution of food aid in North Korea. To magnify its authority to DPRK authorities and to ensure close coordination with other elements of the international humanitarian effort, FALU attached itself to the WFP office in Pyongyang. FALU advised food donors about the areas of greatest need, both nutritionally and geographically, monitored aid distributions and provided reports to donor organizations. Beginning with a staff of two in the fall of 1996, FALU grew to a staff of twenty international monitors resident in Pyongyang and having access to 158 of North Korea=s 211 counties, or 81% of the population. FALU=s founding members were:

ACT - Action by Churches Together (Geneva)

ADRA - Adventist Relief Agency (Silver Spring, Maryland, and Geneva)

CARITAS - the Catholic Church funded, global relief agency based in Rome but supported with contributions from Japan and Hong Kong.

CFGB - Canadian Food Grains Bank (Winnipeg, Canada)

MCI - Mercy corps International (Portland, Oregon)

WVI - World Vision International (Monrovia, California)

Eventually, PMU Interlife of Sweden, MCC of the US, CARE of Germany and the US, and Taize Community of France would contribute to FALU.

FALU, under the capable and patient management of the Canadian citizen Eric Weingardner and his wife, set the precedent for NGO communication with the North Korean government in Pyongyang. Absent home government embassies in Pyongyang, NGOs turned to FALU to facilitate NGO needs regarding the arrival, distribution and monitoring of food aid. To enhance its negotiating position vis a vis the North Korean government, it early on aligned itself with OCHA, the Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs that oversaw all UN relief agencies having representatives in North Korea. This did not, however, subordinate FALU and its membership to the UN. Rather, it enabled the two groups to coordinate their negotiations with the North Korean government, and their parallel food aid monitoring activities.

US Private Voluntary Organization Consortium (PVOC): American NGOs had numerous reasons for striving to establish a representative body in Pyongyang. Absent US government representation in North Korea, visiting American NGOs had to rely on the good will of resident UN agencies and FALU for operational assistance and advice regarding dealings with the DPRK government. The demands on both groups increased as the international humanitarian effort expanded in the fall of 1996 and spring of 1997. From the very beginning, American NGOs shared with international relief agencies and other nations= NGOs concerns about ensuring their distributions went to the most needy North Koreans. Most American NGO Board=s of Directors

require accountability and transparency regarding all aspects of the aid process so as to ensure maximum benefit to the intended beneficiaries. Equally important is maintaining donors' support. American NGOs belonging to InterAction also were intent upon meeting that organization's high standards regarding accountability. Having their own resident representatives in Pyongyang seemed the best way to achieve these goals on a cost effective and continuous basis.

Further reinforcing the need for accountability was the intensifying controversy in Washington, D.C. over the appropriateness of the United States sending humanitarian aid to North Korea. The heated arguments generally paralleled those of the two contending schools of thought on how best to deal with North Korea, i.e. A soft landing@ versus A hard landing.@ The argument split the bureaucracy under the Clinton Administration and Congress. American NGOs found in the Clinton Administration, particularly at the Department of State's Office of Foreign Disaster Relief (OFDA), Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Bureau of Refugee and Migration Affairs, and USAID's Bureau of Humanitarian Assistance influential champions of humanitarian aid. USAID also its critics of aid for North Korea, such as Food for Peace Director David Kegan. Some persons in key Department of Defense policy positions, like Kurt Kambell, had serious reservations, as did some in the US military establishment who believed food aid propped up the North Korean military's combat capability. Congress was also split on the issue. Congressman Tony Hall (Democrat, Ohio) was a vocal advocate of humanitarian aid, and made several fact finding visits to North Korea. Criticism on Capitol Hill was centered in the House of Representatives with Republican chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee being the most vocal opponent. He and other A hard landing@ advocates labeled the aid A appeasement,@ and conducive to prolonging the despotic North Korean regime.

The debate intensified over the next three years, and polarized Washington, D.C.'s foreign policy community. A key theme was the need for accountability and transparency of food aid distribution in North Korea. At issue was whether humanitarian and other assistance promoted or undercut U.S. national interests. Neither A hard@ or A soft@ landing advocates believed North Korea should be trusted. A hard landing@ advocates promoted A monitoring@ the distribution of aid in North Korea. A soft landing@ advocates, including those within the American NGO community, agreed.

Into this debate stepped USAID's first A food monitor@ to visit North Korea. Ms. Sue Lautze, a most confident person, believed her knowledge of the Chinese language and agriculture in China qualified her to assess the situation in North Korea. Shortly after her arrival in Pyongyang, she quickly discovered what American experts on Korea had attempted to impress upon her prior to her departure from Washington - Koreans, be they from the north or south, dislike being compared to the Chinese. She then collided head on with North Korea's rigid and equally assertive bureaucracy. During her first visit to the port of Nampo to observe the unloading of American food aid, she saw trucks, which she believed belonged to the North Korean Army, being loaded with bags of USAID grain. In a dangerous and futile effort to stop what she believed was A diversion@ of food aid to the military, she stepped in front of one of the trucks to prevent it from departing the port area. It is little wonder that Ms. Lautze returned to Washington, DC with numerous negative impressions

of North Korea and vocal claims that food aid was being diverted to the military. Ms. Lautze's lengthy report to OFDA and selected members of Congress also challenged the credibility of UN FAO and WFP reports about food production in North Korea and those organization's efforts to monitor the distribution of humanitarian assistance. Her claims intensified what had become by the summer of 1997 bipartisan political squabbling over food aid and the need to monitor its distribution.

Similar claims of diversion to the North Korean military were made regarding the annual delivery of 500,000 metric tons of heavy fuel oil (HFO) which the United States promised North Korea in exchange for its October 1994 agreement to suspend construction of two nuclear reactors. The Department of State confirmed to the General Accounting Office (GAO) in June 1997 that a small portion of the oil was diverted, but not necessarily to the North Korean military.¹⁶ To address these concerns, the State Department earlier had installed high technology equipment that monitored the flow of HFO into and out of storage tanks.

The WFP had established procedures to track and monitor food aid distribution, but critics of food aid deemed these insufficient because of North Korean imposed restrictions on WFP access to major portions of the country and the small number of UN monitors allowed to reside in North Korea. US critics of food aid insisted food monitors have random access to all phases of the food distribution process. (Critics in Washington of the International Atomic Energy Agency's handling of inspections at North Korea's nuclear facilities had long insisted that the inspections should be random (both time and place).

USAID and the NGO North Korea Working Group in June 1997 seized on one of Sue Lautze's recommendation that OFDA, A... consider funding a representative from the U.S. NGO/PVO community to work with WFP/Pyongyang to establish an NGO Liaison Unit. Unable to establish an official presence in Pyongyang, USAID contracted American NGOs to monitor US food aid distributions. The need to ensure adequate monitoring of food aid distributions, from its inception, was a cornerstone of the Clinton Administration's humanitarian policy toward North Korea.¹⁷ A small group of American NGOs eagerly accepted the challenge. The US government funding would enable them to do what they were already determined to do - ensure accountability through monitoring of their humanitarian aid distributions. Having US government backing for their group, or so they believed, would enhance their leverage when negotiating with authorities in Pyongyang.

The United States Private Voluntary Organization Consortium (US PVOC) was formed in June 1997. Its original members were: Amigos Internacionales, CARE, Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Mercy Corps and World Vision. The group was expanded in March 1999 to include ADRA, the Carter Center, Church World Service (CWS), KASM and LDS. US AID contracted first CRS, then CARE to manage the consortium. USAID's OFDA and the Department of Agriculture funded the consortium's activities with grants that eventually totaled approximately \$4.5 million, and material aid (food and medicine) worth \$55 million.¹⁸

The PVOC had two official goals:

- § Monitor the receipt and distribution of US government food aid in North Korea, and
- § Provide food to unemployed farm and factory workers living in urban areas where factories are closed or underutilized. Half of the food aid was to go to the Northeast provinces of North and South Hamgyong and Ryanggang.

In North Korea, the PVOC members were to:

- § Assess and approve food for work projects in collaboration with the FDRC at the national and local levels.
- § Monitor the progress of work against plans that were developed by the county governments and from which the food allocation was based.
- § Verify the delivery of food to the county warehouses and/or Public Distribution centers, witness the distribution of food from public distribution centers and verify that workers received food for the work they completed.
- § Work closely with WFP staff who provide all logistical support to the receipt and distribution of food from port to county warehouse.

Between August 1997 and June 2000, the PVOCs implemented five projects, four involving food for work (FFW) and one medical: ¹⁹

Phase I - August to November 1997: A five member PVOC team monitored, under the WFP=s authority in Pyongyang, distribution of 55,000 metric tons of US government purchased grain designated for children aged 7 to 17, and the elderly, with a quarter of the grain allocated to Food for Work programs. Of the 55,000 tons, 40% was sent to the northeast process of North and South Hamgyong, while the remainder was allocated to the southwest Arice bowl@ provinces. An estimated 3.7 million people benefitted from the food aid.

Phase II - February to August 1998: Three non-American medical professionals oversaw distribution of a \$5 million Office of Disaster Assistance project. Under UNICEF=s auspices, essential drugs and medical supplies were distributed to children=s institutions and pediatric hospitals. The effectiveness of the monitoring was undercut because the monitoring team reached North Korea before OFDA=s shipment, precluding distribution of the medical supplies prior to the team=s arrival as originally intended.

Phase III - June to October 1998: An eight member American team monitored distribution of 75,00 metric tons of grain for Food for Work (FFW) projects. Fifty projects in five provinces were completed, including reconstruction of sea dikes and coastal and river embankments. An estimated 1.5 million people benefitted from the five month program.

Phase IV - February to July 1999: Another eight member team monitored 75,000 metric tons of FFW grain. Virtually 40% of the food was distributed in connection with projects in the northeastern provinces. During the five month program, 90 projects in 88 counties in seven provinces benefitted 1.6 million North Koreans.

Phase V - July 1999 to May 2000: This phase involved the first direct bilateral food aid program between the United States and North Korea. The previous four phases had been conducted in conjunction with UN agencies. Food aid totaling 100,000 metric tons was programmed to support FFW projects and a separate potato project that involved the planting of 1,000 tons of potato seed. Half of the food aid was sent to the northeastern provinces. Over the eleven month period, aid was distributed to 2.5 million persons who worked on 170 projects in 96 counties located in all of North Korea=s provinces. The projects included the reforestation of 30,000 hectares of mountainside land, the repair of 500 kilometers of drainage canals, and the construction of 19 storage buildings and seven fish ponds. The potato project fell far short of its intended objectives for numerous reasons discussed below.

The fundamental philosophy motivating the PVOC=s projects was to use food aid to induce local officials to concentrate available labor on projects that would improve the agricultural infrastructure, and subsequently increase food production. The population would benefit additionally from the food aid that was provided as compensation for their labor. Over a three year period, the PVOC distributed 305,000 metric tons of US government purchased grain to 2.3 million North Koreans in 130 of 212 counties in eleven of 12 provinces and major cities. Forty percent of the aid was sent to the northeast provinces of North and South Hamgyong Provinces where the shortage of food was most critical among the industrial urban centers of Hamhung, Kimchaek and Chongjin. The Food for Work projects gave thirty four American team members more extensive geographical access to North Korea than previously achieved. These Americans also were able to work with local officials across North Korea.

The PVOC=s Food for Work projects :²⁰

- B reclaimed and/or protected more than 250,000 hectares (approximately 500,000 acres) of arable land,
- B protected from future flooding an estimated 160,000 homes and public buildings,
- B planted more than 20,000 hectares of deforested mountains and hillsides with tree seedlings,
- B constructed some ten aquaculture facilities for the cultivation of fish, and
- B spread fertile top soil over several thousand hectares of arable land.
- B Half or more of the workers in these projects were women.

Constraints: From the beginning, Consortium members, the Department of State and USAID recognized and publicly admitted that the North Korean government=s constraints on the Consortium=s activities prevented effective monitoring of a significant portion of food donations, ...@ according to the 1999 US GAO Report. Nevertheless, the Consortium reported to USAID in 1997 and 1998, and told the GAO in 1999 that, Awhile they felt that most food reaches the intended beneficiaries, the North Korean authorities prevented their effective monitoring of significant amounts of food distributed.@ One might safely conclude that the issue was not one of Adequate,@ so much as one of degree of effective monitoring. ²¹

The DPRK government imposed constraints were significant, but no different than those

long placed on all visitors to North Korea. In fact, many of these constraints are reciprocal, as agreed between the US and North Korean governments in December 1994 and confirmed in March 1995. Official sponsors responsible for the visitors' conduct are mandatory. Detailed itineraries are worked out prior to or at the start of each visit. Military installations, certain industrial establishments and facilities are either off limits or require prior permission for a visit. The movement of visitors is closely monitored. In the United States, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) handles this responsibility. For the most part, its observation of visiting North Koreans is low profile and not obtrusive. In North Korea, the exact opposite is the case. Rarely are foreigners allowed to walk unescorted anywhere in the country. Any North Korean who talks to a foreigner is required to submit a record of conversation to police, an effective deterrent to such conversations. Diplomats are under tighter constraints than temporary visitors. Resident diplomats are required to seek advance approval for trips anywhere outside Pyongyang. Only on rare occasions are they allowed to stay overnight. The taking of photographs is severely restricted, and talking to people in the streets or on farms is not permitted.

In the case of the US PVOC, all dealings with the North Korea government were to be through the Flood Damage Rehabilitation Committee. Born in the fall of 1995, this inter-agency council brought together representatives of Pyongyang's most directly involved government agencies: the Foreign Affairs, Trade and Agriculture Ministries. The FDRC, as foreigners commonly refer to it, was also the point of contact for all UN and other relief agencies in the country, except for a small number of exceptions as discussed earlier. The FDRC's antecedent was the Committee on the Promotion of External Trade. Established in the mid-1980's, its primary role was to interface with the international business community to promote foreign trade and investment.

Given North Korea's long isolation from the main stream of international society, not to mention the DPRK government's distorted portrayal of foreigners in the mass media, misunderstandings between members of the US PVOC and their handlers were inevitable. Then too, given the prior experience of most PVOC members, they brought with them high expectations that they could transform North Korea. Those who had lived in South Korea brought with them the expectation that access to the general population would yield mutual trust and understanding. To varying degrees, all PVOC members experienced frustration in this regard. North Koreans, unlike their kinsmen in the south, view Americans through the prism of the Korean War when they were the target of intense and prolonged American bombing.²² The mental wounds of war have yet to heal. As a matter of fact, the North Korean government remains intent on preventing the healing so as to focus hatred and mistrust on Americans while fostering respect for the North Korean regime.

One of the Consortium's most pronounced failures was to adequately prepare PVOC members for life in North Korea. The NGO managing agencies, Catholic Relief Service (CRS) and CARE, prided themselves in being independent from the U.S. government. This worked to their disadvantage, however, regarding preparations for the PVOC. The valuable experience and knowledge of conditions in North Korea acquired by the small number of US officials who had lived and worked in North Korea was generally ignored. Instead, to brief the PVOC members about

conditions in North Korea, they turned to the growing number of NGO representatives who had made short trips to North Korea.. A temporary visit is a totally different experience compared to residency. Short stay visitors are welcomed as guests, wined and dined, and given a long list of benefits denied those who take up residency. This, combined with the assumption of other PVOC monitors that knowledge of the Korean language and experience in South Korea amply prepared them for life in North Korea.

The stage was set for frustrated personal expectations, and confrontations growing out of a lack of cultural and political sensitivity on both sides.²³ While the Americans were being ill prepared, the North Koreans were given little, if any preparation on how to manage their American Amonitors@ and minimize the risk of confrontation.

Of Spies and Transparency: The North Korean bureaucracy resisted the influx of foreigners after the August 1995 floods. For the long isolated North Koreans, the foreigners= poking and probing of their internal economic and political affairs verged on infringing upon their nation=s sovereignty. Pyongyang=s abundant opponents to the country=s opening were prone to label the foreigners generally well intended curiosity akin to spying. After all, one of the primary reasons for North Korea=s preoccupation with secrecy was to hide the truth behind its impressive facade. As we now know, that truth is far more dismal than outward appearance. Those in North Korea responsible for sheltering the general population from the truth about the outside world, the internal security agency and the military, viewed with suspicion any contact between Americans and North Korea. Time and again, North Korea=s mass media has cautioned its citizens about being deceived by the cultural pollution and decadence of foreigners.

Against this back drop, a small group of American NGO food monitors were called upon to gain North Korea=s compliance with Ainternational@ standards for the distribution of food aid. This required Atransparency,@ Aaccountability@ and Arandom monitoring@ of every aspect of aid distribution. For North Korean=s bureaucracy, particularly its internal security authorities, these requirements merely masked foreign efforts to uncover the extent of North Korea=s internal weaknesses and vulnerability to foreign invasion. For many who opposed the growing foreign presence, food aid and its associated Amonitoring@ was a ATrojan House@ designed to penetrate and undermined North Korea from within.

Unfortunately, visiting Americans occasionally gave the most suspicious North Koreans reason to believe their own propaganda about foreigners. The first resident WFP representative, Trevor Page, opened an office in Pyongyang in November, 1995. His small staff came to include an American citizen who volunteered to work as his public relations assistant. Surprisingly, the North Korean government extended diplomatic immunity to the office and its staff, and allowed it to establish direct communication via fax and telephone with the outside world. The American staffer took advantage of the situation to send occasional reports to Washington, DC=s leading newspaper, the *Washington Post*. Eventually North Korea=s internal security intercepted her reports and moved to arrest her for spying. Fortunately, the DPRK Foreign Ministry declared her *persona non grata* and expelled her to appease internal security.²⁴

Every so often, another case of suspected Aspying@ rekindled North Korean suspicions. In August 1996, a young American citizen of Korean ancestry illegally entered North Korea from China by swimming across the Yalu River. North Korean border guards found him cold and rambling incoherently on a sand bank. He was imprisoned on suspicion of trying to spy on North Korea. The youth claimed he had come to convert North Koreans to Christianity. Eventually a New Mexico Congressman obtained his release. After returning to the United States, the troubled young man committed suicide. A year later, the American citizen president of a South Korean supported technical college in Yanji, China was arrested and detained in Pyongyang. Dr. James Kim was charged with paying ranking North Korean officials for information about internal political matters. Eventually Dr. Kim was released, after paying a fine of \$100,000. In the summer of 1999, the spouse of the PVOC team leader, an American NGO, used frequent email messages to update a congressional staffer about conditions in North Korea. The staffer, Mark Kirk who is now a Congressman, at the time was a U.S. Navy intelligence officer, a fact known to North Korean authorities because of his 1998 visit to North Korea. North Korean internal security seized on the intercepted e-mail reports as evidence that the PVOC was involved in illicit intelligence gathering activities. To minimize the risk of a major confrontation with the United States over the matter, the Foreign Ministry deferred action until the couple had left North Korea for vacation. Their subsequent request for visas to return to North Korea were denied. The frustrated couple made exaggerated claims about the inappropriateness of the North Korean government=s actions. To its credit, the North Korean government never alleged publicly that the couple had done anything inappropriate. The U.S. government wisely did not press the issue so as not to further complicate the return or stay of the PVOC=s other members.

Clearly, those North Korean officials in Pyongyang who advocated the presence of foreigners, particularly NGOs, found themselves on a very unsteady tight rope. For them, most of whom were in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Committee on the Promotion of External Trade, the situation placed them between foreign NGOs who determinedly attempted to pry open North Korean society and to learn as much as possible about its economy, while on the other hand ever suspicious internal security and communist party authorities who sought to preserve old habits of hiding the nation=s reality from the outside world. Given the circumstance, it is indeed fortunate no American NGO has ever been detained by police authorities in North Korea.

PVOC Working Conditions: North Korea is one of the most unpleasant places in the world for Americans to live and work. The hardship is more mental and psychological, although at times the physical hardship can be trying. As outlined above, North Korean suspicions and close monitoring of foreigners= activities make daily life stressful, especially for Americans who live in a free and open society. Personal perspective and personality were equally important factors. The FDRC representative assigned to the PVOC in the fall of 1999 was an ill tempered, hard drinking, tactless fellow. This Mr. Jung had made life miserable for the first team of US Army personnel to enter North Korea as part of the US-DPRK Joint Recovery Operation for US Korean War dead. Complaints to the Foreign Ministry in July 1996 got Jung replaced. Unfortunately, he returned three years later to harass the PVOC. Jung relished in frustrating the Americans. He denied them

legitimate access to the few recreational facilities in Pyongyang - the zoo, bowling alley and similar facilities. . This individual lorded over the PVOC until the Foreign Ministry, at the behest of a visiting Mercy Corps representative, was replaced in April 2000. By then, however, the damage had been done. As a consequence of Jung=s arrogance and condescending attitude toward the last PVOC team, FDRC-PVOC relations were subjected to long term, unnecessary stress and petty minded bureaucratic despotism.

Team members found the housing arrangement uncomfortable. For the first two years of its residency, the PVOC was housed in the Koryo Hotel. This is Pyongyang=s premiere hotel. Its forty five story twin towers dominate central Pyongyang. The well maintained guest rooms are large, equipped with Western furniture, small refrigerator, and television. A choice of restaurants is available. The basement has a bar, swimming pool, medical clinic and other services. A well stocked gift shop is accessible on the first floor, and there are pool tables on the second floor.

PVOC members, however, wanted to live in the diplomatic compound where other resident foreign NGO representatives resided. The American PVOC=s, however, undercut their negotiating position in several ways. They repeatedly claimed they were being housed in the Koryo Hotel so that the DPRK government could receive as much hard currency as possible from the United States government. The room charge for the PVOC, however, was discounted, and the cost of their meals subsidized by the North Korean government. While insisting they should live in Pyongyang=s diplomatic housing area, the PVOC members insisted they did not represent the U.S. government, although USAID paid their salary and all operational expenses. Such a claim, however, disqualified the PVOC from being housed with other foreign NGOs. Unlike the Americans, these NGOs had affiliated themselves with the UN agencies and ECHO, both of which had diplomatic status.

The final PVOC team was moved to the Foreign Ministry=s guest house twenty kilometers southeast of Pyongyang. Just why remains unclear. The PVOC members believed the move was designed to isolate them from other foreigners in Pyongyang. Access to Pyongyang and its foreign community, however, was readily available in the PVOC=s vehicles. The guest house=s rooms are much larger than the hotels. Each room has a small refrigerator and television set. CNN news is available 24 hours a day, as is international telephone communication. The food is abundant, well prepared and inexpensive. The North Korea staff is bilingual, pleasant and intent on providing good service. There was a karaoke room equipped with the latest songs and a pool table. Beer and wine are available on a cash and carry basis. The house is situated on the north bank of the Taedong River and surrounded by a thick forest. PVOC members found the arrangement unacceptable.²⁵

Working conditions, like living arrangements, improved over time, but never measured up to PVOC members= preferences. Contact with North Koreans in distant rural areas, home visits and travel to the Northeast provinces all became realities by the spring of 2000. Restrictions on photography were relaxed, random interviews conducted with project workers, and visits made to Public Distribution System (PDS) centers where local authorities distributed grain rations.

Monitoring: As stated above, the PVOC was never permitted to fulfill USAID

expectations of its monitoring responsibility because of the North Korean government imposed impediments. This did not mean, however, that food aid was being diverted from needy North Korean civilians to the nation's million man military. No one has ever produced verifiable evidence to support the claims of diversion. Some food aid is certain to have gone to the North Korean military. The amount, however, does not appear to have been so great as to make the practice evident. On the contrary, the WFP, based on the experience and extensive access of its twenty full time food monitors and a supporting staff of twenty six persons countered that diversions were unlikely because:²⁶

B the North Korean army and party elite have preferential access to national agricultural production (which is mainly rice and more desirable than the WFP's wheat donations,

B China and other countries provide food aid that can be used by the North Korean military and elite,

B the Army has its own agricultural production,

B there is a culture of respect for state authority, and

B intense regimentation of all sectors of society precludes theft.

Rather, the concern regarding monitoring is that the North Korean government never allowed the PVOC to fully implement the international accepted practices for the monitoring of food aid distribution. This is not surprising given North Korea's long history of refusing to cooperate with international norms. Nevertheless, this is not to say that the effort was futile. When food aid first arrived in North Korea in December 1995, there was one resident food monitor, the WFP resident representative. When the PVOC left North Korea in June 2000, the UN had 46 resident food monitors, a number which subsequently increased in 2002 to 52 monitors. ECHO had its own monitors, and the dozen resident NGO representatives augmented the resident monitoring corps. While the procedures for monitoring food distribution continue to fall short of international preferences, the number of monitors has increased substantially, even taking into account the PVOCs departure. Despite all the criticism, the PVOC's presence provided the US government a greater capacity to monitor food aid distribution than without the consortium's six monitors. If anything, USAID's discontinuation of the PVOC has ended its ability to monitor its continuing disbursement of food aid to North Korea.

Unkept Promises: PVOC members complained often and loudly that the FDRC did not fulfill the terms of the bilateral Memorandum of Understanding that governed their relations. Some of these complaints had merit. The FDRC was slow to improve working conditions, and often unresponsive regarding PVOC concerns about visas, living conditions and the arbitrary decisions of their Ahandler. At the same time, however, the FDRC had legitimate complaints. Mutually agreed upon food aid delivery schedule were more often than not could not be maintained. Grain shipments frequently arrived from the United States weeks after their promised delivery date, complicating the FDRC's efforts to reserve domestic transportation for the timely distribution of the food aid. Hungry North Koreans suffered as a result. In some cases, the delay was caused by USAID's insistence that the food aid first be shipped to Pusan, Korea. There it often remained on the docks exposed to weather and rodents for weeks pending transshipment by a South Korean shipper to North Korea. Not until the PVOC's final year did USAID agree to allow direct shipment from the

US to North Korea, something that had been legally possible for American shippers since the spring of 1996.

Negotiating Tactics: Here also there were problems on both sides. North Korea officials tend to respond slowly and negatively to the requests of foreigners. Not surprisingly, US officials do likewise regarding North Korea request. This may have something to do with individual concerns about not appearing to sensitive to the other side=s needs. Doing so might encourage some to allege the responsive individual=s loyalty to their Aown side@ might be sagging. Equally plausible is the preference to impressive one=s superiors with the assertiveness of one=s stance when dealing with the Aother side.@ Such an attitude more often than not results in confrontation with tempers aflame and problems compounded. On numerous occasions, PVOC team leaders attempted to solve problems by escalating the level of discussion. Rather than containing tempers and creating an atmosphere conducive to resolution, escalation expands the number of personalities involved and draws into the discussion Agovernmental@ concerns. Sever PVOC members believed they could improve work conditions for the PVOC through candid public revelation of their concerns during visits to the United States. These well intended, but ill expended energy played into the hands of those in Washington, DC intent upon ending or reducing food aid to North Korea. Such efforts only further compounded the problems. North Korean authorities responded to the harsh rhetoric emanating from Washington with their own unproductive rhetoric.

Eventually, the spiral of accusations and counter-claims narrowed the options to one - discontinuation of the PVOC. In the end, this was a victory for those in Pyongyang who had opposed having resident American food monitors. For those in Washington who wanted to improve the monitoring, they ended up empty handed.

PVO Agricultural Consortium: While the US government funded PVOC Food for Work monitoring group received considerable attention, especially in Washington, DC, a much more successful working group within InterAction, the PVO Agricultural Consortium, implemented a series of highly successful, agriculturally sophisticated and logistically complex projects. Without US government funding, this entirely private NGO initiative successfully demonstrated to North Korea=s Academy of Agricultural Sciences and Ministry of Agriculture, key elements in the formulation of Pyongyang=s agricultural policy, the benefits of double cropping or planting a rapidly growing grain crop in the spring prior to the planting of corn in late spring and rice in early summer. The practice long been discontinued at the direction of former North Korean leader Kim Il Sung.

By pooling its resources and coordinating its efforts, the NGO consortium aimed to maximize its impact both on enhancing food production in North Korea and convincing the Pyongyang government to alter its conventional agricultural policy. Since the 1970s, North Korea=s leaders= policies had maximized dependence on two grains, rice and maize. Rice requires an extensive irrigation support system. By 1995, North Korea=s irrigation system was in disrepair. Maize, on the other hand, is highly vulnerable to drought. Both crops require intense labor in a land with a dwindling supply of farm machines and fuel.²⁷

The double crop projects, instigated by the UNDP, aimed to reduce the North Korean people's dependence on foreign food aid by demonstrating to them ways to increase their own domestic production of grain. The NGO consortium cultivated various varieties of barley and winter wheat seed acquired in the United States and China. To determine the best climate and soil locations, experimental plots were planted in several provinces with the cooperation of the UNDP, North Korean Academy of Agricultural Sciences and the Ministry of Agriculture. Much of the Consortium's work was concentrated at the Daechong Farm in Unpa County, North Hwanghae Province.

The effort for an international one. Mercy Corps' senior vice president Ellsworth Culver and Washington, DC representative Nancy Lindborg, both highly experienced in the area of humanitarian assistance, coordinated the activities of the InterAction based Agricultural Consortium. Dr. Kimpil Joo served as the project's field director. Born in North Korea but raised in South Korea, Dr. Joo was an American citizen who had obtained her Ph.D. in agronomy at Cornell University's international respected school in the agricultural sciences. Dr. Joo and her husband, a specialist in animal husbandry, began visiting North Korea in 1989 to offer advice on how to improve domestic grain production. Dr. Joo brought the first North Korean agricultural study tour to the United States in 1992 for a tour of American agriculture in the mid-west. Dr. Joo included training components consisting of technology exchange between leading agricultural research centers in the United States and the North Korean Academy of Agricultural Sciences. She and her NGO colleagues also sponsored several group tours for North Korean agriculture specialists to visit centers of agricultural research and agriculture related industries across the United States. In Pyongyang, the consortium worked closely with Roberto Christian, the world's leading foreign expert on agriculture in North Korea and a senior technical adviser to the UNDP.

Between 1997 and 1999, numerous American and South Korean NGOs contributed money, labor and materials to the agricultural consortium. The NGOs included: American Friends Service Committee, Canadian Food grains Bank, Join Together Society (Korean-Americans from New York), Korean American Sharing Movement, Latter Day Saints Charities, Lutheran World Relief, Mennonite Central Committee, Mercy Corps, World Vision, South Korean Presbyterian Church and the Korea Sharing Movement. It is important to note that several NGOs represented on the USAID PVOC were not involved with this Agricultural PVOC, including: ADRA, Amigos Internationales, CARE, the Carter Center, Catholic Relief Services, and Church World Services.

The Agriculture PVOC made several significant contributions during its two and one half years of effort. It wed the humanitarian effort of an international consortium of NGOs from the United States, Canada, and South Korea to agricultural expertise in these nations, the UNDP and in North Korea. It introduced North Korea's formulators of agricultural policy to new farming methods and materials through technology exchange, training and study tour programs. Ultimately, the North Korean government adopted the consortium's double cropping methods on a national basis. Additionally, the consortium's efforts produced tens of thousands of tons of seed and food from its crops of barley and winter wheat. Alas, this success had gone largely unnoticed

because of the failure of the so-called Apotato project.@

Potato Project: This undertaking was one of the most controversial and least productive of the USAID funded PVOC. The DPRK Academy of Agricultural Sciences initiated the concept in a proposal to the UNDP in January 1999 entitled, AThe Development of the system for Virus-free Potato Seed Production.@ Dr. P. Kim Joo, an experienced agronomist active in North Korea since 1992 and vice president of Agglobe Technologies, recast the proposal and forwarded it to the InterAction Agricultural Working Group in February 1999. Her proposal called for the planting of 1,000 metric tons of seed potato on 500 hectares of land to produce 20,000 metric tons of potatoes, a harvest sufficient to feed 55,000 people one kilogram of potatoes per day over a one year period, or to be used as seed for planting at the beginning of the next crop year. By early March, 1999, the majority of the 12 members of the PVO Food Consortium (PVOC) and InterAction Agricultural Working Group expressed either a strong interest or commitment to the project. Dr. Joo originally estimated the project would cost \$754,800. After the Working Group had designated Thomas McCarthy its representative for the potato project, the budget ballooned to \$1.7 million.²⁸ Eventually, the project cost \$1 million, of which the Consortium paid 60% and the US government the remainder.

This well intended project was plagued with problems from the beginning. Once the costs had ballooned, only US government funding could make the project possible. USAID was willing to fund the proposal, but first certain political considerations had to be resolved. Specifically, North Korea had to agree to allow a US government team to inspect a suspected secret underground nuclear facility. Agreement on this highly visible and politically sensitive issue was not reached until March 16, 1999. Because of the US government=s funding of the project, a joint US government, PVOC delegation traveled to Pyongyang to negotiate the terms of the potato project. An understanding was not reached until April 17.²⁹

Already the project was considerably behind schedule. The potato seed needed to be planted by mid-May, given North Korea=s short growing season. Consortium representatives, at great expense, acquired potato seeds in Colorado and China. The Colorado seed had to be airlifted to North Korea. The Chinese seed potatoes were readily available, but transporting them to North Korea proved problematical because of China=s long standing reluctance to make shipments via rail to North Korea since North Korea tended to be reluctant to return the rail cars to China. Unfortunately, some of the Chinese potato seed proved to have a virus that rendered it useless. Then too, the FDRC was uncomfortable about working with the Consortium=s representative, Thomas McCarthy. As a consequence, his contract with the Consortium expired after two months. Heavy rains just before the potatoes were to have been harvested caused much of the crop to rot in the ground. The project proved costly, controversial and unproductive. Nevertheless, the lessons learned from the experience convinced the North Korean government to continue expanding potato production. Today, potatoes form a still growing element of North Korea=s annual food production.³⁰

Changing Directions: The American NGO engagement of North Korea continues, but

with significant changes. The number of NGOs peaked in 1999, and has since subsided. None have had resident representatives in Pyongyang since June 2000. As the number has declined, the network of NGOs centered at InterAction has loosened considerably. The North Korea Working group still gathers, occasionally. There is less involvement with food aid. Increasingly since 1998, many large scale American NGOs shifted their focus from food aid to specialized pursuits focused on reforestation, renewable energy, medicine, specialized farming technics and educational exchange. Korean-American professional medical associations have excelled in sending advanced medical equipment and conducting medical training programs in North Korea. American Friends Service Committee has conducted training programs in medical sciences and agronomy, and maintains to collective farms. Christian Friends of Korea and the South Korean based NGO Eugene Bell Foundation specialize in the diagnosis and treatment of tuberculosis. The Asia and the Sequella Foundations, together with Catholic Relief Services, supplement these efforts. The Asia Foundation initiated a program in international business law in December 1998. The Nautilus Institute has specialized in renewable energy development, and Mercy Corps has established an apple orchard with twenty thousand trees.

American NGO involvement in North Korea has declined and is unlikely to again return to its peak level of 1999. The reasons are certainly too many to catalogue comprehensively here. A representative list will suffice. The incumbent Bush Administration has been much less supportive of NGO involvement in North Korea than its predecessor. The need for NGOs in North Korea has declined. A major reason for this is the South Korean government=s increasing willingness to supply some of North Korean agriculture=s most critical needs, and the maturing network of South Korean NGOs capable of distributing this aid inside North Korea. Meanwhile, USAID has shifted the focus of American NGOs toward Afghanistan because of the urgent and substantial need there for humanitarian aid.

The international community=s efforts to rebuild North Korea=s capacity to cultivate more food have stabilized grain production through crop diversification, better use of fertilizers and pesticides, and repair and improvement of the agricultural infrastructure. The North Korean government, after nearly two decades of ignoring agriculture, has resumed investment of scarce fiscal resources in the agricultural sector. The irrigation system is being shifted from an electricity dependent to a gravity fed one. Farm fields are being rationalized for more efficient use of farm machinery, some of which South Korea is supplying. North Korea=s income from the Diamond Mountain tourist business has increased the nation=s ability to purchase fuel from China to power farm equipment. Rice and maize production have stabilized while more farm land is planted in potatoes, barley and wheat. Fish farming has been adopted, small animal husbandry improved with the introduction of rabbits from Italy and geese from China. New seeds, herbicides and pesticides have also been introduced.

The international humanitarian community, in which American NGOs performed and still play a prominent role, merits credit for many of these improvements. Much of the American NGOs effectiveness in North Korea between 1996 and 2000 likewise has many reasons. Only some of the more likely explanations need be listed here. The United Nations= relief agencies made it possible

for American NGOs to engage North Korea and to establish viable programs within this once cloistered nation. Worthy of particular note are the resident representatives of the World Food Program such as Trevor Page and David Mortin, UNDP=s technical expert Roberto Christian, and World Health Organization representative Eigel Sorensen. They provided American NGOs invaluable insight into the situation in North Korea, the nation=s most pressing needs and assistance and support in dealing with North Korea=s formidable bureaucracy and the deeply rooted suspicions of all North Koreans toward foreigners.

The Korean-American community deserves special praise for its pioneering work in establishing bridges of communication between the United States and North Korea. The willingness of InterAction=s North Korea Working Group set the precedent for cooperation and collaboration that ultimately evolved into an international network of NGOs in North America, Europe and East Asia working together to address the food and health crises of the North Korean people. As InterAction North Korea Working Group walked the political tight rope between Seoul and Pyongyang, Pyongyang and Washington, and the squabbling political factions within the United States, it concentrated on its primary goal - providing the humanitarian assistance to the maximum number of needy North Koreans. Along the way, it established an enduring international network of NGOs, and developed and implemented a strategy that emphasized collaboration between NGOs, governments and international relief agencies. Ultimately, the strategy accented self help through food for work programs, the promotion of self sustainable agricultural practices and restoration of forests and watershed.

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APPENDIX I. NGO FOOD AID TO DPRK 1995-2001
(Nov. To Oct., Metric Tons, Source: UNWFP)

NGO	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	TOTAL	
ACT (Swiss)	2,030	3,970	5,000	2,000	-0-	-0-	13,000	
ADM (USA)	-0-	-0-	327	-0-	-0-	-0-	327	
ADRA (Swiss)	38	272	118	-0-	-0-	-0-	428	
ASEB (Japan)	7	50	25	-0-	-0-	-0-	82	
CAD (Europe)	-0-	192	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	192	14,029
CAMM	100	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	100	
Caritas (HK)	10,006	29,164	25,000	10,000	21,291	2,107	97,568	
Caritas (Japan)	-0-	-0-	1,522	-0-	-0-	-0-	1,522	
CFGFB (Canada)	-0-	-0-	16,000	10,000	12,500	10,000	48,500	
CC (Swiss)	100	-0-	360	-0-	-0-	-0-	460	148,150
CESVI (Italy)	-0-	-0-	23	-0-	-0-	-0-	23	
CHS (USA)	-0-	-0-	-0-	36	35		71	
COY (Japan)	-0-	-0-	28	-0-	-0-	-0-	28	
CWS (USA)	-0-	1,676	113	-0-	-0-	61	1,850	
CWW (Ireland)	-0-	-0-	495	-0-	-0-	-0-	495	2,467
EBCF (ROK)	814	4,620	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	5,434	
FHI (USA)	-0-	255	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	255	
FKI (ROK)	-0-	11,183	6,000	-0-	-0-	-0-	17,183	
FTC (USA)	180	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	180	
FWFP	116	284	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	400	23,452
GAA (Germany)	-0-	-0-	11,795	-0-	-0-	-0-	11,795	
GTF (Philippines)	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	19	19	
HBA (Hungary)	-0-	-0-	45	-0-	-0-	-0-	45	
Hyundai (ROK)	-0-	-0-	70,000	-0-	-0-	-0-	70,000	
IFRC (Europe)	45,255	72,841	10,000	-0-	-0-	-0-	128,096	209,955
JTS (ROK)	-0-	396	396	396	411	396	1,595	
JVC (Japan)	-0-	-0-	23	-0-	-0-	-0-	23	
Kapanamur (Germany)	-0-	-0-	5,000	-0-	-0-	-0-	5,000	
KAP (USA)	-0-	-0-	360	-0-	-0-	-0-	360	
KBOA (ROK)	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	18	18		
KCF (ROK)	-0-	-0-	150	-0-	-0-	1,000	1,150	

APPENDIX I. NGO FOOD AID TO DPRK 1995-2001 (continued)
November to October, Metric Tons, Source: UNWFP

NGO	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	TOTAL	Sub-total
KJCM (ROK)	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	4,000	4,000	
KMA (ROK)	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	105.4	-0-	105.4	
KNAC (ROK)	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	12,000	12,000		
KRC (ROK)	-0-	51,885	99,392	-0-	20	-0-	151,297	168,552
KRCA (Australia)	-0-	-0-	114	-0-	-0-	-0-	114	
KRCC (ROK)	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	2,700	3,200	5,900	
KSM (ROK)	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	6,256	2,617	8,873	
KUC (ROK)	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	150	150	
KWF (ROK)	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	20	17	37	15,074
LDSC (USA)	80	-0-	180	-0-	1,000	-0-	1,260	
LIONS (ROK)	-0-	-0-	-0-	240	-0-	240		
MCI (USA)	50	19	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	69	
MSF (France)	-0-	-0-	20	-0-	-0-	-0-	20	
Nestle Corp (ROK)	-0-	-0-	29	-0-	-0-	-0-	29	1,618
OKBM (ROK)	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	160	329	489	
OKDM (ROK)	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	510	-0-	510	
OPEC	-0-	-0-	1,156	-0-	-0-	-0-	1,156	
OXFAM (UK)	320	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	320	
PMU (Sweden)	145	1,000	1,500	-0-	-0-	-0-	2,645	5,120
RCCJ (Japan)	161	-0-	114	-0-	20	-0-	295	
SBAP (USA)				160	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-
SCIA (Cambodia)	2,005	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	2,005	
SEN (Japan)	-0-	-0-	17	-0-	-0-	-0-	17	
SVA (Japan)	-0-	128	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	128	2,605
Taize Comm (France)	-0-	-0-	878	-0-	-0-	-0-	878	
UMCOR (USA)	-0-	300	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	300	
UNICEF	1,911	25	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	1,936	
WFP Various	-0-	1,833	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	1,833	
WSC (USA)	-0-	868	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	868	5,815
WVI (USA)	1,640	1,040	301	-0-	-0-	30	3,011	
WVK (ROK)	100	3,600	3,600	3,600	3,600	3,600	18,100	21,111

SUB-TOTALS 65,218 185,601 260,081 25,996 48,869 39,579 625,344
APPENDIX II.a. NGO FOOD AID TO DPRK 1996-2001 BY REGION
United State, Metric Tons (M/T), Source: UN WFP
Percent of Total NGO Food Aid to DPRK

Region	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	TOTAL	% Total
ROKorea	914	66,473	179,567	3,996	7,801	3,996	262,747	48.8 %
Europe	57,994	107,439	60,234	12,000	21,291	2,107	261,065	48.4 %
USA	2,110	8,501	1,281	-0-	1,036	96	13,024	2.4 %
Japan	168	178	1,729	-0-	20	-0-	2,095	0.4 %
Sub-totals	61,186	182,591	242,811	15,996	30,148	6,199	538,931	100.0 %

UNITED STATES	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	TOTAL
ADM (USA)		-0-	-0-	327	-0-	-0-	327
CHS (USA)	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	36	35	71
CWS (USA)		-0-	1,676	113	-0-	-0-	1,850
FHI (USA)		-0-	255	-0-	-0-	-0-	255
FTC (USA)		180	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	180
KAP (USA)		-0-	-0-	360	-0-	-0-	360
KASM	?	5,211	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	5,211
LDSC (USA)		80	-0-	180	-0-	1,000	1,260
MCI (USA)		50	19	-0-	-0-	-0-	69
SBAP (USA)		160	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	160
UMCOR (USA)		-0-	300	-0-	-0-	-0-	300
WSC (USA)		-0-	868	-0-	-0-	-0-	868
WVI	1,640	1,040	301	-0-	-0-	-0-	2,981
Sub-total	2,110	8,501	1,281	-0-	1,036	96	13,024

APPENDIX II.b. NGO FOOD AID TO DPRK 1996-2001 BY REGION
East Asia, Metric Tons (M/T), Source: UN WFP (Continued)

ROKOREA	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	TOTAL
EBCF (ROK)	814	4,620	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	5,434
FKI (ROK)	-0-	11,183	6,000	-0-	-0-	-0-	17,183
Hyundai (ROK)	-0-	-0-	70,000	-0-	-0-	-0-	70,000
JTS (ROK)	-0-	396	396	396	411	396	1,995
KBOA (ROK)	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	18	18
KCF (ROK)	-0-	-0-	150	-0-	-0-	1,000	1,150
KJCM (ROK)	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	4,000	4,000
KMA (ROK)	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	105.4	-0-	105.4
KNAC (ROK)	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	12,000	12,000	
KRC (ROK)	-0-	51,885	99,392	-0-	20	-0-	151,297
KRCC (ROK)	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	2,700	3,200	5,900
KSM (ROK)	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	6,256	2,617	8,873
KUC (ROK)	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	150	150
KWF (ROK)	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	20	17	37
LIONS (ROK)	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	240	-0-	240
Nestle Corp (ROK)	-0-	-0-	29	-0-	-0-	-0-	29
OKBM (ROK)	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	160	329	489
OKDM (ROK)	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	510	-0-	510
WVK (ROK)	100	3,600	3,600	3,600	3,600	3,600	18,100
Sub-total	914	71,684	179,567	3,996	14,022	27,327	297,510
JAPAN							
ASEB (Japan)	7	50	25	-0-	-0-	-0-	82
Caritas (Japan)	-0-	-0-	1,522	-0-	-0-	-0-	1,522
COY (Japan)	-0-	-0-	28	-0-	-0-	-0-	28
JVC (Japan)	-0-	-0-	23	-0-	-0-	-0-	23
RCCJ (Japan)	161	-0-	114	-0-	20	-0-	295
SEN (Japan)	-0-	-0-	17	-0-	-0-	-0-	17
SVA (Japan)	-0-	128	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	128

**APPENDIX III. VALUE OF NGO FOOD AID TO DPRK
1996-2001, US \$1,000, Source: UNWFP**

NGO	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	TOTAL	VALUE
ACT (Swiss)	450	600	76					
ADM (USA)	----	1,000	-?-					
ADRA (Swiss)	----	----	-?-					
ASEB (Japan)	----	----	-?-					
CAD (Europe)	----	----	-0-					
CAMM	31	----	-0-					
Caritas (Europe)	2,936	4,750	361			859		
Caritas (Japan)	----	----	628					
CC (Swiss)	----	----	61					
CFGFB (Canada)	----	----	2,640					
CESVI (Italy)	----	----	-?-					
CHS (USA)	----	----	-0-					
COY (Japan)	9	----	-0-					
CWS (USA)	----	----	54			221.1		
CWW (Ireland)	----	----	31					
EBCF (ROK)	623	296	-0-					
FHI (USA)	----	-?-	-0-					
FKI (ROK)	----	-?-	990					
FTC (USA)	----	----	-0-					
FWFP	116	43	-0-					
GAA (Germany)	----	----	3,599					
GNK (ROK)	----	----	----	----	----	370.8		
GTF (Philippines)	----	20	-0-					
HBA (Hungary)	----	----	-0-					
Hyundai (ROK)	----	----	11,900					
IFRC	1,700	----	4,096					
IFRC (Japan)	----	----	342					
JTS (ROK)	----	-?-	-?-	?	?	228.6		
JVC (Japan)	----	-?-	-0-					
Kapanamur (Germany)	----	-?-	1,174					

**APPENDIX III. VALUE OF NGO FOOD AID TO DPRK
1996-2001, US \$1,000, Source: UNWFP
- Continued -**

NGO	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	TOTAL VALUE
KAP (USA)	----	-?-	61				
KARC (ROK)	----	----	----	----	----	54.1	
KBOA (ROK) ----	----	----	----	----	30.4		
KCF (ROK)	----	-?-	104	C-	?	200.0	
KJCM (ROK)	----	----	----	----	----	676.0	
KNACF (ROK)	----	----	----	----	----	12,743.5	
KPCGA (ROK)	----	----	----	----	----	18.4	
KRC (ROK)	2,000	20,527	17,000	?	?	?	
KRCA (Australia)	----	24	----	----	----	----	
KRCC (ROK)	----	----	----	----	?	575.4	
KRWA (ROK)	----	----	----	----	----	52.3	
KSM (ROK)	----	----	----	----	?	2,184.0	
KUC (ROK)	----	---	----	----	----	197.0	
KWF (ROK)	----	----	----	----	----	2,801.0	
LDSC (USA)	----	----	342	?	?	----	
MCI (USA)	----	56	----	----	----	----	
MSF (France)	----	----	-?-				
Nestle Corp (ROK)	----	400	-0-				
OKBM (ROK)	----	---	----	----	----	87.0	
OPEC	----	----	-?-				
OXFAM (UK) ----	39	-0-					
PMU (Sweden)	----	----	255				
RCCJ (Japan)	----	81	8				
SBAP	64	-0-	-0-				
SCIA (Cambodia)	----	-0-	-0-				
SEN (Japan)	18	-0-	-?-				
SVA (Japan)	----	72	-0-				
Swiss NGOs NGOs	----	---	----	----	----	145.0	
Taize Comm (France)	----	----	149				
UMCOR (USA)	-?-	-?-	-0				

APPENDIX III. VALUE OF NGO FOOD AID TO DPRK
1996-2001, US \$1,000, Source: UNWFP
- Continued -

NGO	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	TOTAL	VALUE
UNICEF	-?-	-?-	-0-					
US NGOs	----	---	----	----	----	24.0		
WFP Various	-?-	-?-	-0-					
WSC (USA)	300	----	-0-					
WVI	601	300	-?-	----	----	67.0		
WVK	-?-	-?-	-?-					
SUB-TOTALS								

**APPENDIX IV. a. 1998 VALUE OF NGO NON-FOOD
AID TO DPRK 1998, US \$1,000**

Source: 1999 UN Annual Consolidated Appeal

NGO	Agri	Fertilizer	Seed	Health	Water	Education	Support	Total
ACF				190				190
ADRA						12	12	
Care (German)							214	214
Care (USA PVOC)							1,280	1,280
Caritas	36							36
CWW	322*			220				542
DPRA	479						479	
Help Age				566				566
GAA	190*						336	526
Humedica				106				106
IFRC				2,452			1,826	4,278
MSF				489				489
NRC				338				338
PMU				192				192
Sub totals	\$1,027			\$4,553			\$3,668	\$9,248

*Support for double cropping.

**APPENDIX IV. b. VALUE OF NGO NON-FOOD
AID TO DPRK 2001, US \$1,000
Source: 2002 UN Annual Consolidated Appeal**

NGO	Agri	Clothes	Health	Water	Education	Support	Total
AFSC	156.3	----	----	----	----	----	156.3
CAD	----	----	210.0	----	----	----	210.0
Caritas	81.0	----	592.0	----	----	----	673.0
CWS	----	221.1	----	----	----	----	221.1
GAA	366.2	----	----	----	1,180.6	----	1,546.8
IFRC	----	----	93.0	----	----	645.5	738.5
SDR	----	----	----	----	----	296.0	296.0
UNFPA	----	----	800.0	----	----	C-	800.0
WV /USA	1,086.0	----	----	----	----	----	1,086.0
Sub-total	1,689.5	221.1	1,695.0	----	----	2,122.1	5,727.7
RoKorea							
EBCF	----	----	3,099.1	----	----	----	3,099.1
FKI	----	4,095.0	----	----	----	----	4,095.0
FOP	44.1	----	----	----	----	----	44.1
FOL (ROK)	128.0	----	----	----	----	----	128.0
GNK	----	215.4	2,267.2	----	----	69.9	2,552.5
JTS	----	38.8	----	----	----	----	38.8
KADECO	387.2	----	----	----	----	----	387.2
KCFS	22.8	538.8	----	----	----	----	561.6
KBOA	----	60.3	----	----	----	----	60.3
KFA	293.5	----	----	----	----	----	293.5
KRC	----	565.0	----	----	----	----	565.0
KCPA	----	300.0	----	----	----	----	300.0
KMA	----	----	385.0	----	----	----	385.0
KPCGA	80.0	----	----	----	----	----	80.0
KRCC	13.5	36.7	----	----	----	----	50.2
Nation							
KRWA	----	25.4	----	----	----	----	25.4
KSM	3,098.0	832.0	----	----	----	----	3,930.0
KWC	324.0	----	----	----	----	----	324.0
KWF	----	----	2,292.0	----	----	----	2,292.0

OKBM	----	74.0	----	----	----	----	74.0
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**APPENDIX IV. b. VALUE OF NGO NON-FOOD
 AID TO DPRK 2001, US \$1,000 (continued)**
Source: 2002 UN Annual Consolidated Appeal

NGO	Agri	Clothes	Health	Water	Education	Support	Total
OKDM	----	----	2,000.0	----	----	198.0	2,198.0
SMM	519.0	----	----	----	----	----	519.0
SNSC	----	297.2	----	----	----	297.2	

Private							
Kim Seung-jung		154.9	----	----	----	----	154.9
NC/Korea	684.8	----	----	----	----	----	684.8

Sub-totals	5,594.9	7,233.5	10,043.3	----	----	267.9	23,139.6
TOTAL	\$7,284.4	\$7,454.5	\$11,738.3	-0-	-0-	\$2,390.0	\$28,867.3

**APPENDIX V.
LIST OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
INVOLVED IN DPR KOREA**

ACF - Action Contre la Faim, NGO, food security (France)
ACT - Action by Churches Together, NGO, food security (Switzerland)
AD, - Archer Daniels Midland, business firm, funds for WFP food aid purchase (USA)
ADRA - Adventist Development Relief Agency, Christian NGO, food security, alternative energy,
(Switzerland)
AFSC - American Friends Service Committee, NGO, food security and public health (USA)
AMDA - Association of Medical Doctors of Asia, NGO, public health (Japan)
AmerAid - American Aid, NGO, food security (USA)
Amigos Internacionales, NGO, food security (USA)
ANCC - American national Council of Churches, NGO, food security (USA)
ANU - Australian National University, NGO, education (Australia)
AREP - UNDP agricultural Recovery and Environmental Projection Program
ASEB - Association to Send Eggs and Bananas, NGO affiliated with the Association for Aid
and Relief (AAR), food aid (Japan)
BCNR - Buddhist Committee for National Reconciliation, NGO, agriculture (RoKorea)
BKUM - Buddhist Korea Unity Movement, NGO, agriculture (RoKorea)
CAD - Children=s Aid Direct, NGO, food security, public health, (Europe)
CAMM - Christian Association for Medical Mission, NGO, food aid (?)
CARW - Catholic Association of Religious Women, NGO, medicine (RoKorea)
CFC - Campus fur Christus - NGO, food aid (Switzerland)
Cap Anamur, NGO, public health (Germany)
Caritas - Catholic NGO, food security and public health (Europe, Hong Kong,)
Caritas (Japan) - NGO, food aid (Japan)
CESVI - Cooperazione e Sviluppo, NGO, food security and public health (Italy)
CFGB - Canadian Food Bank, NGO, food security (Canada)
CFK - Christian Friends of Korea, NGO, public health, TB (USA)
CHS - Children=s Home Society of Minnesota, NGO, food aid (USA)
CNRC - Catholic National Reconciliation Committee, NGO (RoKorea)
COY - City of Yokohama, NGO, food aid (Japan)
CPAJ - Catholic Priests= Association for Justice, NGO (RoKorea)
CWW - CONCERN Worldwide, NGO, food security and public health (Ireland)
CRS - Catholic Relief Services, NGO, food security and public health (USA)
CWS - Church World Service, NGO, food security and public health (USA)
DPRA - Danish People=s Relief Association, NGO, food security (Denmark)
DRI - Direct Relief International
DRM - Doorae Maul, farm in Najin-Sonbong, NGO, food aid (RoKorea)
DW - Diakonisches Werk, member of FALU (?)
EBCF - Eugene Bell Centennial Foundation, NGO, food security (USA/RoKorea)
EBF - Eugene Bell Foundation, coalition of nine NGOs, food aid, TB (RoKorea)

APPENDIX V.
LIST OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
INVOLVED IN DPR KOREA
(Continued)

EC - European Commission, humanitarian assistance
ECHO - European Commission Humanitarian Office
FALU - Food-Aid Liaison Unit (European and Canadian NGOs)
FDRC - Flood Damage Rehabilitation Committee of the DPR Korea government
FFP - Forest for Peace, NGO, reforestation (RoKorea)
FHI - Food for the Hungry International, NGO
FHIK - Food for the Hungary International, Korea, NGO, food aid (RoKorea)
FKI - Federation of Korean Industries, NGO, food aid (RoKorea)
FOL - Friends of Love, NGO, medical supplies (RoKorea)
FTC - Feed the Children, NGO, food aid (USA)
FWFP Friends of the World Food Program, NGO, food aid (?)
GAA - Deutsche Welthungerhilfe/German Agro Action (DWHH/GAA), NGO, food security and public health (Germany)
GNK - Good Neighbors Korea, NGO, agriculture, medicines (RoKorea)
GPK - Good People of Korea, NGO, agriculture, fertilizer, potato seed (RoKorea)
GTF - George Ty Foundation, NGO, food aid (Philippines)
HAI - Help Age International, NGO, public health (Europe)
HBA - Hungarian Baptist Aid, NGO, food aid (Hungary)
HI - Handicap International (?)
HUB - Homeland Unity Brotherhood, NGO (RoKorea)
Hyundai - Chung Ju-young=s Hyundai Corporation, NGO, food aid (RoKorea)
ICF - International Corn Foundation, NGO, agriculture (RoKorea)
IFAD - International Fund for Agricultural Development
IFRC - International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, NGO, food aid distribution and public health (ECHO supported)
JPA - Japan Postal Account, NGO, food aid (Japan)
JTS - Joint Together Society, NGO, food aid (RoKorea)
JVC - Japan International Volunteer Center, NGO, food security (Japan)
KARC - Korea Association of Rotary Clubs - NGO, food aid (RoKorea)
KADECO - Korea Agricultural Development and Economic Cooperation, NGO (RoKorea)
KAP - Korean-American Presbyterians, NGO, food aid (USA)
KAPANAMUR - NGO, food aid (Germany)
KBOA - Korea Buddhist Order Association - NGO, food aid (RoKorea)
KCF - Korean Christian Federation, NGO, food aid (RoKorea)
KCFS - Korean Church Federation of Support for North Korea, Protestant, NGO (RoKorea)
KFA - Korean Farmers Association - NGO, agriculture (RoKorea)
KJCM - Korea Jeju Citizens Movement to Help the North - NGO, food aid (RoKorea)
KMA - Korean Medical Association - NGO, medical supplies (RoKorea)

APPENDIX V.
LIST OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
INVOLVED IN DPR KOREA
(Continued)

KMC - Korean Methodist Church, NGO, food aid (RoKorea)
KNAC - Korean National Agricultural Cooperative Federation, NGO, food aid (RoKorea)
KNCC - Korean National Christian Council, Protestant, NGO (RoKorea)
KPCGA - Korean Presbyterian Church General Assembly, Protestant, NGO (RoKorea)
KRC - Korean Red Cross, quasi-government agency, food aid (RoKorea)
KRCA - Korean Resource Center of Australia, NGO, food aid (Australia)
KRCC - Korea Reconciliation Committee of Concord, NGO, food aid (RoKorea)
KRWA - Korean Religious Women=s Association, NGO, clothing (RoKorea)
KSM - Korea Sharing Movement, NGO, food aid (RoKorea)
KUC - Korea Ulsan City Association - NGO, food aid (RoKorea)
KWF - Korea Welfare Foundation, NGO, medicine factory, medical equipment (RoKorea)
KWPSNC - Kangwon Province South-North Cooperative, NGO, agricultural support (RoKorea)
KWSANK - Korean Women=s Solidarity Association for North Korea - NGO, food aid (RoKorea)
LDSC - Latter Day Saints Charities, Christian NGO, food security (USA)
LUK - Lions Union of Korea, NGO (RoKorea)
MAC - Medical Aid for Children of DPRK, NGO, children=s health (RoKorea)
MCI - Mercy Corps International, NGO, food security (USA)
MDM - Medecins du Monde, NGO, public health (France)
MSF - Medecins san Frontieres, NGO, public health (France)
NAC - Neue Apostolic Church, NGO, public health (Germany)
NI - Nautilus Institute, NGO, alternative energy (USA)
NCC - National Christian Council, Japan, NGO, food aid (Japan)
NCCC - National Council of the Church of Christ (see CWS)
NCHNK North Cholla Helping the North Korean People, NGO, food aid (RoKorea)
Nestle Corp. - commercial firm, NGO, food aid (RoKorea)
NPF - Nippon Foundation (formerly Sasakawa Foundation (Japan)
NRC - Norwegian Refugee Council, NGO, public health (Norway)
OCHA - UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODM - Okedongmu, NGO, aid to children and nursery schools (RoKorea)
OKBM -One Korea Buddhist Movement - NGO, food aid (RoKorea)
OXFAM - Oxford Committee for Famine Relief, NGO, public health (UK)
OPEC - Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, commercial cartel, food aid
PDS - Public Distribution System (food) in DPR Korea
PMU - Pingstmissionens u-landshjalp, NGO, food security (Sweden)
PVOC - Private Voluntary Organization Consortium, USAID supported, food for work (USA)
PWJ - Peace Winds Japan, NGO, food and medical aid (Japan)

APPENDIX V.
LIST OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
INVOLVED IN DPR KOREA
(Continued)

RCCJ - Relief Campaign Committee for Children, NGO, food aid (Japan)
RIZ - Rotary International Zurich, NGO (Switzerland)
RoKRC - (see KRC, Korean Red Cross)
SBAP - Southern Baptist, NGO, food aid (USA)
SCIA - Suma Chinghai International Association, NGO, food aid (Cambodia)
SHA - Samcheng Hai Association (?)
SDC - Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation, government, agriculture (Switzerland)
SDR - Swiss Disaster Relief
SEN - Shinnyo-en, Buddhist NGO, food aid (Japan)
Shanti (see SVA)
SIDA - Swedish International Development Agency, government (Sweden)
SMM - Saemaul Movement, NGO, agriculture, goats, potato seed (RoKorea)
SNSC - South-North Sharing Campaign, NGO, food aid, clothing (RoKorea)
SVA - Shanti (formerly Sotoshu) Volunteer Association, Buddhist NGO, food aid (Japan)
TAF - The Asia Foundation, NGO, educational exchange (USA)
Taize Comm - French Religion Commission, NGO, food aid (France)
TCU - 21st Century Unity, NGO, agriculture (RoKorea)
Triangle - NGO, public health (France)
UMCOR - United Methodist Charities (USA)
UNDP - United Nations Development Program
UNESCO - United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFAO - United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization
UNFPA - United Nations Population Fund
UNICEF - United Nations Children=s Fund
USAID - United States Agency for International Development
WCC - World Council of Churches
WFP - United Nations World Food Program
WHO - United Nations World Health Organization
WSC - World Summit Council, NGO, food aid (USA)
WVI - World Vision International, NGO, funds from RoKorea, Japan and USA.
WVK - World Vision Korea, NGO, 6 noodle factories, six farms, potato projects (RoKorea)

Appendix VI. a. Statement of Humanitarian Principles DPR Korea - November 1998

The organizations providing assistance to DPR Korea and who have participated in the formulation of the Consolidated Appeals for 1999, 2000 and 2001, have agreed to support the following humanitarian principles in order to ensure the successful implementation of the Common Humanitarian Action Plan.

All organizations providing humanitarian assistance to the DPRK are urged to similarly support these principles:

:

1. Knowledge about the overall humanitarian situation in the country according to assessed needs;
2. Assurance that humanitarian assistance reaches sectors of the population in greatest need;
3. Access (physically and to information) for assessment, monitoring and evaluation;
4. Distribution of assistance only to areas where access is granted. (At the May 1999 International NGO Conference in Beijing, the following clarification was added: all of the agencies that subscribe to these principles agree to the principle that if access is denied to certain areas, then aid should not be provided if it cannot be followed through monitoring and evaluation);
5. Protection of the humanitarian interests of the population;
6. Support to local capacity building;
7. Beneficiary participation in program planning and implementation;
8. Adequate capacity in terms of international staff;
9. Meet the health and safety needs of the international humanitarian organizations. (At the May 1999 International NGO Conference in Beijing, the following was added: particularly regarding access to medical facilities in case of emergencies involving support staff).

Consensus Statement of all UN Agencies, Non-governmental Organizations and Donor Agencies Operating in the DPRK

The representatives of NGOs, UN agencies and donor agencies operating in the DPRK are in agreement that effective, accountable humanitarian assistance is still required in the country.

Our view is that whilst international assistance has already had a considerable positive impact on the crisis in the DPRK, severe difficulties still exist in the food, nutrition, health, water and agricultural sectors.

Whilst assisting the DPRK to address such problems, at the same time striving to promote and ensure humanitarian principles and accountability, a common and balanced approach from the UN, donors and from NGOs, is required.

We are well aware of the constraints and difficulties of operating in the DPRK. We believe that only with a continued presence and constructive engagement here will we be able to work

towards the position of providing accountable assistance. We remain committed to working towards these objectives.

(Signatories)*

Action contre La Faim (ACF, France)	United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
Children=s Aid Direct (CAD, Europe)	United Nations Children=s Fund (UNICEF)
Cap Anamur (Germany)	United Nations Development Program (UNDP)
Cooperazione e Sviluppo (CESVI, Italy)	United Nations World Food Program (WFP)
CONCERN Worldwide (Ireland)	United Nations World Health Organization (WHO)
Deutsche Welthungerhilfe (DWHH/GAA) (Germany)	United nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
Oxfam (United Kingdom)	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)
Hugarian Baptist AID (HBA)	Swiss Disaster Relief (SDR)
Handicap International	
Triangle (France)	
<u>FALU (Food Aid Liaison Unit):</u>	<u>US PVO Consortium (PVOC):</u>
Action by Churches Together (ACT)	Amigos Internacionales
Adventist Development and Relief Agency International (ADRA)	CARE
Caritas International	Catholic Relief Services (CRS)
Canadian Foodgrains Bank (CFGB)	Mercy Corps International (MCI)
World Vision International	World Vision USA

Dated: November 25, 1998 (Updated April 21, 1999 and March 14 2001)
Pyongyang, DPRK

*It is important to note that the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) was not a signatory.

Appendix VI. b. Consensus Statement of all UN Agencies, NGOs and Donor Agencies -December 1999

There is unanimous agreement among UN agencies, NGOs and donor agencies operating in the DPRK that in spite of progress in certain areas during the past two years the humanitarian crisis in the DPRK is still ongoing, with particular areas and segments of the population experiencing greater difficulties than others. Malnutrition, safe water, adequate sanitation and public health in general remain serious problems to be addressed. Programs in these areas continue to suffer from difficult operating conditions that limit and constrain implementation, accountability, verification and access to the most vulnerable.

Agencies are concerned about these restrictive conditions. They have led to Oxfam=s regrettable decision to withdraw from the DPRK, and present a hindrance to the promotion of humanitarian principles, and verification of humanitarian assistance. We believe that only with adherence to these operating principles will we be able to work towards helping those in greatest need with accountable assistance, and we remain committed to these objectives.

(Signatories)*

Action contre La Faim (ACF, France)
Adventist Development Relief Agency
(ADRA, Switzerland)
Children=s Aid Direct (CAD, Europe)
Cap Anamur (Germany)
Cooperazione e Sviluppo (CESVI, Italy)
CONCERN Worldwide (Ireland)
Deutsche Welthungerhilfe (German
(Agro Action)
Hugarian Baptist AID (HBA)
Handicap International
Triangle (France)

United Nations Office for Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
United Nations Children=s Fund (UNICEF)
United Nations Development Program (UNDP)
United Nations World Food Program (WFP)
United Nations World Health Organization (WHO)
United nations Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO)
International Federation of Red Cross and Red
Crescent Societies (IFRC)l
Swiss Disaster Relief (SDR)

FALU (Food Aid Liaison Unit):

Caritas International
Canadian Foodgrains Bank (CFGB)
United Methodist (UMCOR)

US PVO Consortium (PVOC):

Amigos Internacionales
CARE
Catholic Relief Services (CRS)
Mercy Corps International (MCI)
World Vision USA

Dated: December 11, 1999 (Updated March 14 2001) Pyongyang, DPRK

*Three earlier signatories did not sign the 1999 consensus statement. Two had withdrawn from the DPRK: Oxfam (United Kingdom) and Action by Churches Together (ACT). World Vision International remained active in North Korea, but because of increased funding from South Korea, decided to avoid taking potentially confrontational public stances.

**Appendix VI. c. Consensus Statement of all UN Agencies,
Non-governmental Organizations and Donor Agencies
Operating in the DPRK - March 2001**

United Nations agencies, non-governmental organizations and donor agencies (hereafter Agencies@) working in DPR Korea are aware of recent allegations regarding humanitarian programming in the country.

1. The focus of the work of the agencies in DPR Korea is on mitigating the ongoing humanitarian crisis in the country through programmes which address the immediate food, health, water and sanitation and educational needs. At the same time, programmes attempt to look to the future and assist DPR Korea in longer-term economic and social sustainability through small-scale capacity building programmes and other forms of intermediate assistance including programmes falling within the Agricultural Rehabilitation and Environmental Projection Programme (AREP).
2. Progress has been made since the 1998 and 1999 Consensus Statements (see above) that acknowledged the complex operating conditions that apply to DPR Korea. While restrictions apply that limit the full implementation of the humanitarian programme, these are not new problems and are ones that the agencies formulated in the Humanitarian Principles for DPR Korea in 1998 (see above) to address. These are brought to the attention of the (DPRK) Government regularly.
3. Twelve more counties can be accessed now compared with 1998, and consequently a greater proportion of the population reached, although an improvement in the quality of access is sought. More monitoring trips are taking place and more beneficiaries are visited in their homes. There has been some improvement in access to information for programming, as well as closer interaction with the (DPRK) Government, and a better understanding of working modalities and expectations. Two new NGOs have arrived, one of which will support activities for the handicapped, a new sector for the international humanitarian programme.
4. While progress is slow, agencies wish to renew their commitment to the 1998 and 1999 Consensus Statements. We are convinced that our engagement, maintenance of an in-country presence and an adherence to the Humanitarian Principles have been positive factors in improving the situation for the people of DPR Korea and that this approach continues to be the best way to proceed. In particular the humanitarian and rehabilitation programmes implemented in the country during the last five years have, without doubt, achieved positive results for people in much of the country. However, more remains to be done in order for operation conditions to be considered satisfactory, especially if programme assistance is to move towards sustainable rehabilitation and development.
5. Agencies firmly believe that engagement by development donors is now a prerequisite for a sustainable improvement in conditions for the population, and thus continue to urge development donors to engage with DPR Korea.

**Appendix VI. c. Consensus Statement of all UN Agencies,
Non-governmental Organizations and Donor Agencies
Operating in the DPRK - March 2001
(continued)**

(Signatories)*

Children=s Aid Direct (CAD, Europe)	United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
Cooperazione e Sviluppo (CESVI, Italy)	United Nations Children=s Fund (UNICEF)
CONCERN Worldwide (Ireland)	United Nations Development Program (UNDP)
Deutsche Welthungerhilfe (German (Agro Action))	United Nations World Food Program (WFP)
Handicap International	United Nations World Health Organization (WHO)
Hungarian Baptist AID (HBA)	United nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
PMU Interlife (Sweden)	
Triangle (France)	
	Swiss Disaster Relief (SDR)

FALU (Food Aid Liaison Unit):

Caritas International
Canadian Foodgrains Bank (CFGB)
Diakonisches Werk
Global Aid Network
Movement (GAIN)
World Vision International

US PVO Consortium (PVOC):

Amigos Internacionales
Adventist Development Relief Agency CARE
Catholic Relief Services (CRS)
Korean American Sharing Movement (KASM)
Mercy Corps International (MCI)

Dated: March 30, 2001

Pyongyang, DPRK

*Neither ECHO, the European Community Humanitarian Organization nor the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) signed this statement. Four NGOs also did not sign it, having withdrawn earlier from North Korea: Action contre La Faim (ACF, France), Cap Anamur (Germany), United Methodist (UMCOR) and World Vision USA.

Two European NGOs established residence in North Korea in 2001: PMU Interlife (Sweden) and Diakonisches Werk. World Vision International returned to FALU.

**Appendix VII. a. Humanitarian Relief Effort
in DPRK - November 1998**

DPRK Government

**Flood Damage
Rehabilitation Committee**

Foreign Affairs Ministry
Internal Security Ministry
Agriculture Ministry
Academy of Agricultural
Sciences
Committee on Promotion
Of External Trade
Trade Ministry
Transportation Ministry

FDRC<----->OCHA

FDRC<----->FALU

FDRC<----->ECHO

FDRC<----->US PVOC US Private Voluntary Consortium

**International Relief Agencies
Europe, North America, etc.**

**Office of the Coordinator for
Humanitarian Affairs**

UNICEF
UNDP
WFP
WHO
FAO
IFRC
SDR

Food Aid Liaison Unit

ACT
ADRA
Caritas International
CFGB
WVI

**European Community
Humanitarian Organization**

ACF
CAD
Cap Anamur
CESVI
CWW
GAA
Oxfam
HBA
Handicap International
Tiangle

Amigos Internacionales
CARE
CRS
MCI
WV (USA)

**Appendix VII. b. Humanitarian Relief Effort
in DPRK - December 1999**

DPRK Government

**International Relief Agencies
Europe, North America, etc.**

**Flood Damage
Rehabilitation Committee**

Foreign Affairs Ministry
Internal Security Ministry
Agriculture Ministry
Academy of Agricultural
Sciences
Committee on Promotion
Of External Trade
Trade Ministry
Transportation Ministry

FDRC<----->OCHA

**Office of the Coordinator for
Humanitarian Affairs**

UNICEF
UNDP
WFP
FAO

IFRC

SDR

FDRC<----->FALU

Food Aid Liaison Unit

Caritas International
CFGB
UMCOR

FDRC<----->ECHO

**European Community
Humanitarian Organization**

ACF
ADRA
CAD
Cap Anamur
CESVI
CWW
GAA
HBA
Handicap International
Tiangle
WVI

FDRC<----->US PVOC US Private Voluntary Consortium

Amigos Internacionales
CARE
CRS
MCI
WV (USA)

Agencies which departed: WHO, ACT, MSF, Oxfam

New: UMCOR

**Appendix VII. c. Humanitarian Relief Effort
in DPRK - March 2001**

DPRK Government

**International Relief Agencies
Europe, North America, etc.**

	<u>FDRC</u> <-----> <u>OCHA</u>	<u>OCHA</u>
Foreign Affairs Ministry		UNICEF
Internal Security Ministry		UNDP
Agriculture Ministry		WFP
Academy of Agricultural Sciences		FAO
Committee on Promotion Of External Trade		WHO
Trade Ministry		UNFPA
Transportation Ministry		IFRC
		SDC (formerly SDR)
	<u>FDRC</u> <-----> <u>FALU</u>	<u>FALU (Food Aid Liaison Unit)</u>
		Caritas International
		CFGB
		DW (Diakonisches Werk)
		WVI
	<u>FDRC</u> <-----> <u>ECHO</u>	<u>ECHO</u>
		CAD
		CESVI
		CWW
		GAA
		HBA
		Handicap International
		PMU Interlife
		Tiangle
	<u>FDRC</u> <-----> <u>US PVOC</u>	<u>US PVOC*</u>
		Amigos Internacionales
		ADRA
		CARE
		CWS
		MCI
		WV (USA)

New arrivals: UNFPA, DW, PMU

Returns: WHO, WVI

Departed: ACF, Cap Anamur, CRS, UMCOR, **US PVOC** ended operation effective June 2001

END NOTES:

- 1i. When the small group of American NGOs arrived at the Koryo Hotel, State Department officer Kenneth Quinones was eating supper. With his assistance, the group was able to meet with officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Russ Kerr, Vice President for Relief and Rehabilitation of World Vision International visited North Korea one week later, February 20-24 accompanied by Dr. Stephen Linton, then a researcher at Columbia University. Source: Russ Kerr, ADPRK WVI Trip Report, @ dated February 25, 1996. For assessments of the food situation see: Republic of Korea Government information sheet dated January 23, 1996 and entitled, AAssessment of North Korea=s Food Shortage.@ Also see: Larry Nicksch, ANorth Korean Food Shortages: U.S. and Allied Responses. CRS Report for Congress, April 11, 1996. Also see: Center for the Advancement of North Korean Human Rights, AMan-made Famine in North Korea,@ Seoul, Spring 1998 (as indicated by content).
2. Interview with UNDP Resident Representative Faruq Akizad, Pyongyang, September 1995. Quinones received a copy of the video tape from the Ministry of Agriculture and in October 1995 gave a copy to colleagues in the Department of Defense.
3. UN Director of Humanitarian Assistance untitled memorandum dated January 27, 1996.
4. InterAction memorandum, ANorth Korea Working Group - the InterAction Members,@ no date; InterAction, AHumanitarian Aid in North Korea - What US Non-Governmental Organizations Are Doing - November 1997 Media guide; InterAction, *InterAction Member Activity Report - North Korea - August 2000*.
5. Han Chong-gil, *Ryongjong chunghak, 1921-94*. (Ryongjong Middle School). Ryongjong City, Killim Province, China: 1994. P. 16. Personal interview with Dr. Hyun. The middle school he graduated from was a center of Korean nationalistic sentiment and anti-Japanese literary criticism during the 1930s.
6. For Admiral Murphy=s biography see: John Moore, AThe Lobbyist Who Came In From the Cold,@ *National Journal*. (October 8, 1994) No. 41, pp. 2326-2331. Bright and Bright corporation profile states, AThere are four members on our board of Directors, headed by our Chairman Admiral Daniel J. Murphy, USN (Ret.). The other members of our board are Mr. Jim Courter, Mr. Joe Canzari and Mr. David Chang.@ Bright and Bright and Nikko Enterprises were essentially the same company. Data on the companies commercial transactions with North Korea are taken from company documents.
7. InterAction, ANorth Korea Working Group - the InterAction Members,@ Unpublished and undated manuscript. Also conversations with InterAction coordinator Jim Bishop and Working Group Chairman Ellsworth Culver. Also see: InterAction, ADPRK working Group Contact List, December 1998,@ an unpublished manuscript.

8. InterAction, *A Humanitarian Aid in North Korea - What US Non-governmental Organizations Are Doing*, @ Washington, DC, November 1997; Disaster Response Unit, *A InterAction Member Activity Report - North Korea*, @ Washington, DC.; September 2000. @
9. Quinones interview with Committee members and Musgrove I coordinator Ellsworth Culver.
10. Quinones interview with Dr. Stephen Linton and his brother in Pyongyang, 2000.
11. Interview with Dr. Jong Park, KASM executive secretary and *A The Korean American Sharing Movement*, @ press release dated September 19, 1997.
12. InterAction, *International NGO Conference on Humanitarian Assistance to the DPR Korea: Past, Present and Future May 3-5, 1999. Beijing, China. Conference Proceedings*. Washington, DC: 1999.
13. UNFAO and UNDP, *Agricultural Recovery and Environmental Projection (AREP) Programme*. Rome: UNFAO, 1998.
14. InterAction, *AUS-Japan Common Agenda Public-Private Partnership (P-3) E-News Updates*, @ Washington, DC: January 29, 2001. Also: Quinones interviews with InterAction P-3 coordinator Richard Forrest and Japanese NGO representatives.
15. Conference Steering Committee, *A Report of the Third International NGO Conference on Humanitarian Assistance in North Korea: Cooperative Efforts Beyond Food Aid*, @ Seoul, Korea: June, 2001.
16. US General Accounting Office, *Nuclear Non-proliferation - Implementation of the U.S./North Korean Agreed Framework on Nuclear Issues*. Washington, D.C.: US General Accounting Office, 1997. Pp. 14-15.
17. GAO Report to the Chairman, Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, *Foreign Assistance: North Korea Restricts Food Aid Monitoring*. Washington, DC, Government Printing Office, 1999. Page 4.
18. USAID Memorandum 1/27/97.
19. Unpublished manuscript, *A Private Voluntary Organization Consortium Team Assessment*, @ Pyongyang, spring, 2000. This manuscript is not publicly available.
20. *Ibid.*
21. GAO Report, 1999. Also see: GAO Report, *Foreign Assistance - U.S. Bilateral Food Assistance to North Korea Had Mixed Results*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office,

2000.

22. Quinones interviews with North Korean officials in the fall, winter and spring of 1995-96.

23. The most vocal American critics of the USAID sponsored consortium actually had little to do with it, either in the United States or in North Korea. One of the most outspoken of the critics was Tom McCarthy. Hired by CARE to evaluate the PVOC, Mr. McCarthy expressed very negative views to Quinones about the PVOC in September 1999, several months before the PVOC had completed its work. Mr. McCarthy prematurely negative assessment of the PVOC may have been in part because PVOC=s discontinued in the summer of 1999, after only two months, his \$11,000 per month consultant=s contract with the potato project. The other equally outspoken critic was Ken Duppy, a leading figure in Amigos Internationale. His criticism appears to have been rooted, at least in part, to his negative political view of North Korea.

24. Personal experiences of Dr. C. Kenneth Quinones who handled these situations on behalf of the United States while temporarily residing in North Korea.

25. Quinones interviews with PVOC team members and North Korean officials assigned to the FDRC, March and September 2000.

26. Quinones interview with OCHA/WFP Resident Coordinator in Pyongyang David Morton. The interview was conducted in Tokyo at the Second International NGO Conference on Humanitarian Assistance to North Korea, June 2000.

27. Quinones, *op.cit.* *Korea=s Economy 1997*. The discussion of InterAction=s Agriculture PVOC is based on numerous interviews Quinones had with Dr. Kim Joo, Ellsworth Culver, Nancy Lindborg, Victor Hsu, Chong-ae Yu, FDRC Acting Director General Jon In-chan, numerous other members of the consortium, the North Korean Academy of Agricultural Sciences and officials in the FDRC. Quinones also had access to many of the consortium=s working papers, none of which are currently available publicly.

28. P. Kim Joo, A1999 Emergency Food Aid Through Agriculture: I - 1999 Potato Project Proposal,@ unpublished memorandum dated February 27, 1999; email dated February 26, 1999; Draft Concept Paper, APotato Assistance to the DPRK - PVO Agricultural Consortium, dated March 4, 1999; Letter to Mr. Jon In Chan, Acting Director, Flood Damage Rehabilitation Committee, Pyongyang, dated April 29, 1999.

29. GAO Report 2000, page 11,

30. PVOC Harvest Assessment Team ADPRK Potato Assistance Support Project, Seed Potato Component - Project Review Document,@ Pyongyang, DPRK: October 11, 1999. GAO Report 2000.